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Prologue 
The early 1990's China Fever has definitely come to a moratorium ——despite it may be an 
overstatement to describe the investment climate of China using vocabularies like 
"lackluster"，it still comes to reason that time has come for foreign investors to re-think (and 
re-invent) their China investment strategies and implementation plans. 
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Year 1999 could be the "Year ofConsolidation" for China's foreign direct investment 
momentum. It would be constructive to the investor community for us to 
(1) recap what has happened to China in the last 2 decades, 
(2) acquire a profound understanding of where China stands in the international 
investment arena, and 
(3) figure out where China is going in the years to come. 
Although China remained relatively immune to the Asian financial turmoil, its growth 
momentum was overshadowed by the declining influx of foreign capital. Such decline may 
stem from the increasing competitiveness from China's neighboring Asia Pacific countries. 
Currency devaluation of China's Asia Pacific neighboring countries wear away China's 
traditional cost advantages. 
It is undeniable that what makes China appealing to international investors in the past could 
no longer be an amulet for China to survive the after-shocks of Asian financial turmoil, not to 
mention further developments. This calls for the importance of adopting "anticipatory 
approach" in investment planning. This "pro-active" approach is essential to Chinese 
government for their strive to entrench the building blocks for Chinese economic growth 
engines. The same goes for entrepreneurs making business ventures in China. The key to 
business success is a "pro-active" approach instead of an "opportunistic" one. 
To be frank, the Chinese government already did a greatjob in paving (on anticipatory basis) 
the way for foreign investors by: 
-Institutionalising a better legal (and enforcement) system 
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-Fostering a less monopolistic economic structure (which demolishes most entry barrier) 
• Levelling the business battlefield and making it a more competitive one, and 
-Reiterating its clear intention to rely on market mechanism 
(Their intention has been, insofar, forcefully supplemented by consistent policy changes) 
_ Rolling out a number ofprofound technocrat-led structural reform to the economy 
All these give rise to a "better" business-operating environment for foreign investors to 
implement their PRC investment strategy and develop their PRC presence. To be frank, we 
have passed the time when the main purpose of investing into China is solely for its cost 
advantages. Seasoned enterprises investing into China, instead, should eye China's 
magnificent domestic market with its growth potential yet to be unleashed. 
In light ofthe changing and volatile business environment flooded with unprecedented 
demands and unstructured contingencies, the agile and responsive small-to-medium sized 
enterprises (the "SME") find their niche. Being small and not being hands-tied-at-back by the 
rigid corporate bureaucracy, their responsiveness gives them a unique position to capture 
emerging business opportunities and even to anticipate forth-coming business opportunities, 
which have yet to crystallise. 
Flexibility and openness of SME are built upon their flat organisation, light yet strong 
corporate infrastructure and flexible cost structure. They are set to participate in the growth 
process and share the fruit ofChinese economy. Their only problem is ……how to secure 
the necessary expansion capital to realise their enthusiastic business plan (especially in the 
widespread credit squeeze in the post-Asian financial crisis arena)! This report will touch a 
bit on the SME growth patterns and offer non-traditional alternatives to fund their business 
growth. 
This changing business horizon in China also gives significant bearing to multinational 
corporation ("MNC") operating in matured market (say US and European markets) where 
business and political risks are low BUT market demand is saturated and growth potential is 
low. 
For MNCs with well-founded business operations in saturated market sitting on a pool of 
recurring cashflows, they should set for direct investment in China (or other emerging market 
economies). From a global risk management perspective, they could comfortably allocate a 
(relatively small) portion oftheir assets and resources to China market without significantly 
increasing their global business risk. If they are sitting on a portfolio oflow-risk businesses 
in matured markets, tapping into the high-risk emerging markets in search ofrevenue and 
market share comfortably allocate a portion of their assets and resources to China market 
without significantly increase their overall business risk is a natural strategic choice. 
The 21st century contemporary business foresight has nothing to do with "risk-aversion" but 
closely associated with "global risk management" instead. 
The main focus of the report ！ 
This report is narrowly focused at the Chinese venture capital industry and seeks to devise a 
road map for venture capital houses operating in China. Through discussions on evolution of 
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the industrial policy in China, PRC experience and lessons leamed from industrial players, 
analysis ofdriving forces and growth factors for the industry, we could also explore how the 
Chinese institutional factors has been improved in the past decades. From which, we may 
have a better understanding ofhow China is and where it is going! 
How this report could be useful ！ 
This report also serves to, indirectly, introduce the concept of venture capital financing to 
emerging businesses in the region. The author will fteher elaborate in the main text how the 
SME proved to be an enormous growth propellant for the region's economic development. 
For these SME, venture capital could be an important alternative non-banking source of 
expansion capital. 
For existing foreign investors in the Chinese battlefield, this report highlights a bit on how 
their peer groups are doing in China. The report also comes with a brainstorming section, 
which sketches the foreign investors' roads ahead, and shares some business brainchild thus 
unfold. This could possibly help them in re-aligning their action steps and re-deploying their 
corporate resources and management efforts. 
For potential foreign investors eye on the PRC market, this report delivers a basic overview 
on China's investment climate and business peculiarities. The author will also share his views 
on how China could, on a going-forward basis, enhance its international competitiveness. 
Such desirable improvements could serve as a benchmark for potential foreign investors in 
devising their China investment strategy and action plans. 
A brief wrap up on betterment of Chinese institutional factors ！ 
What the author has made clear through this report is how foreign investments could nurture 
(1) a more consistent government policies, 
(2) a more transparent regulatory framework and enforcement, 
(3) a more open domestic business practices and norms, 
(4) a more efficient domestic finance market. 
All these contributed to mark a number of milestones in making China (1) a better place for 
foreign direct investments, (2) a less monopolistic (semi-deregulated) market, (3) attaining a 
lowered entry barrier, (4) offers lower business transactions and agency costs. 
This report could, in this regard, be considered as an informal logbookjotting China's efforts 
in reducing its business risks and the degree of uncertainty to foreign investors. 
For the dedicated crusaders of 
Asian Venture Capital industry 
the region，s admirable shareholder-value architects. 
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With a 1.2 billion-strong population, coupled with one of the region's highest 
economic growth potential, China has long been considered as the powerhouse for 
Asian's economic growth and development. 
After almost two decades' phenomenal growth and amid the Asian recovery 
period in the post-Asian financial crisis era, it comes to a time for us to re-visit the 
China growth drivers and inhibitants. It's also a time for investors to re-define 8c re_ 
deploy their China development plans according to earlier lessons. 
Despite, the relative immunity of Chinese economy from the Asian financial 
crisis, there is no guarantee for China's future prosperity. The post-Crisis liquidity 
squeeze already hindered, and even suffocated, the growth ofmany Chinese 
enterprise, both domestic or foreign-invested ones. During the post-Crisis time, the 
once impetus "growth companies" place survival, instead of sustainable growth, top 
on their priority list. 
The region's commercial banks traditionally downplayed the importance of 
emerging businesses in the economic structure. These growth companies takes up the 
larger chunk ofthe bitterness coming from the credit dry-up. Under this stressful 
situation, opportunity comes up for venture capitalists to step in and nurture the next 
wave ofChinese economic boom. Hand-in-hand with the influx of expansion capital 
from these seasoned venture capitalists, I believe the institutional factors will naturally 
improve and give rise to a more-friendly investment climate in China. This, in turn, 
will further enhance China's attraction to foreign investors. 
• 
• • • 111 
Preliminary 
The 1997 edition ofChina Statistics Yearbook indicated that the population of 
China already reached 1.2 billion. The young population^ coupled with one ofthe 
region's highest economic growth potential and household saving rate�，China offers 
considerable room for growth and development. 
Pre-Crisis GDP Growth Rate of China 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook / World Bank 
Over the past decade, business and economic environment ofChina have been 
developing at tremendous pace which is in line with China's rapid economic reform 
1 China Statistics Yearbook 1997 indicated that 60% of the Chinese populace 
is below age of35. 
2 Asian Development Bank reported that the 1998 gross domestic saving of 
China already reached 38.8% ofits GNP. 
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and growth. This is further exemplified (by recapping from the China Statistics Year 
books) the growth ofChina retail market at an average growth o f l8% during 1985 to 
1996 -— way ahead of the 11% average inflation rate for the period. 
Where China is and Where it is Going 
Common to other emerging market flourishing economies, China showed the 
same post-exponential-growth syndrome as well. In view ofthe recent Asian 
financial turmoil & the liquidity squeeze that follows, a "Financing Gap" has evolved. 
The proliferating post-Crisis panic among the financial institutions triggers an 
indiscriminate credit shrinking. Even fundamentally sound enterprises with good 
growth prospect are having trouble even in maintaining their existing bank credit 
facilities -- not to mention secure new credit lines. This leads to escalating difficulties 
for growing companies to fuel its development with the necessary "expansion 
capital". 
At the same time, ironically, we saw over US$31 billion� investment money 
chasing after China investment deals with barely half of this amount committed. 
Some commentaries even claimed in the pre-Crisis arena, competition among 
investment houses has driven investment projects unreasonable costly. 
Ofcourse, it is undeniable that buying into attractive and promising 
enterprises are still costly even in the post-Crisis time despite the general trend of 
3 Fannin, Rebecca A. "The Great Capital Gap". Asia, Inc. December 1995 / 
January 1996: 40-45. 
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competitive-pricing of investments in the Asian countries. (To be frank, in the post-
Crisis era, it is much easier for promising companies to distinguish themselves among 
their peer groups and thus demand for a much higher premium to financial investors.) 
To fuel the future Asian economic development, there is a pressing need to 
bridge this macro-liquidity mismatch which could dampen the region's recovery and 
growth! 
The Post-Asia Financial Crisis Investment Climate 
Professor Krugman ofMassachusetts Institute ofTechnology attributed the 
1997 Asian financial crisis to be a punishment for the Asian sin of"crony capitalism" 
it is 
aproblem of moral hazard in extending credits O^oth domestic and 
overseas lending) to favoured economic sectors & companies where 
government is perceived to provides unreserved support (thus, implicit 
guarantees) for favoured borrowers. 
The authors considers "Moral Hazard" to be explicit (or implicit) public and 
private sector activities that encourage encouraging reckless behaviour in the belief 
that the culprit will always be bailed out. 
Other prevailing variants of this Asian sin include government directives 
seeking Asian domestic financial institutions to extend credits to preferred businesses 
(say, to finance Korean government-picked chaebols, Malaysian 450-meter landmark 
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Petronas Twin Tower, the world's tallest commercial complex, or Suharto's family-
linked Indonesian businesses). 
This is an undue influence, or at least an invitation, to excessive credit risk-
taking among financial institutions. The author agrees, in principal, with Krugman's 
criticism and considers this an Asian-mutant of"ineffective financial market 
regulation and credit control". 
Accordingly, the key to Asian economic recovery is not "across-the-board" 
credit retrench but a "regulated credit process and post-draw-down monitoring". 
Elixir to Assuage the Asia Financial Crisis 
We have to accept the short-term pain ofletting the inefficient companies go 
bankrupt and simultaneously sustaining momentum of growing companies. I believe 
during this tough time, it is those companies who could build up their muscles will 
survive the cut and wait for their tum to fly high in the next economic up-swing. 
I believe the "3R Principle,, could bring our Asian economies to rescue i.e. 
RE-DEFmE, RE-PRIORITISE and RE-DEPLOY. 
The Asian countries need to re-define their competitive strength and weakness 
and re-prioritise their resources. The most important (sometimes painful) step is to 
have (government and private) financial resources siphoned to the most viable 
businesses and re-vitalise the country's economy by re-deploying their respective 
government and private sector resources. Such re-deployment must be conducted by 
sticking to vigilant business evaluation and viability test. 
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Given the (1) severity and proximity of the Asian economic crisis, (2) its 
devastating impact that sweeps through the region and (3) the lack o fa quick and 
straight-forward remedy, we see a tremendous need for expansion (at times even 
survival) capital. This provokes an immediate need for longer-term and stable source 
of capital for the Asian enterprises. 
This Asian enterprise survival problem is magnified by the post-Crisis 
"across-the-board" liquidity and credit squeeze that follows. The cash-starved 
enterprises, in the absence of traditional source of financial (in the form ofdebt or 
public equity including bank loans, bonds, IPOs, rights issues etc.) are facing 
increasing difficulties in bridging the financing gap. 
Asian Invitations to Venture Capitalists 
This wide-spread hunger for long-term capital offers much opportunities for 
venture capitalists. Now, the emerging enterprises and entrepreneurs are more willing 
to accept lower valuations and significant equity-entry discounts. 
It is undeniable that the forthcoming private equity transactions in distressed 
Asian countries will be very different from traditional direct equity investments in a 
number ofways. This include (1) the complexity of deal structure, (2) lengthy 
negotiation due to increased number of stakeholders, (3) difficult choices in deciding 
which business to keep and which business to abandon. Among these, the 
fundamental challenge is to identify the real enterprise core competence and 
turnaround the business by leveraging upon this core competence. 
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What Venture Capitalists can Offer in Asia 
The venture capitalists could provide valuable strategic advice and other 
value-added services to the Asian enterprises. On a going-forward basis, the venture 
capitalists can 
1. work together with entrepreneurs as a value-adding business partner, 
2. bring additional diversity of management insights to the investees 
companies; and 
3. optimise the sourcing and application of expansion capital over time. 
This radical change in this set of post-Crisis business environment presents 
itselfto venture capitalists a broadened domain of requirement that calls for more 
disciplined and value-oriented approach than before. 
The Asian financial crisis posted a new face to the overall business 
environment in Asia. In this dynamic and rapid-changing post-Crisis environment, 
there are much flexibility open to the business community in their strive to revive the 
ailing economy. These new challenges perfectly illustrate how energetic corporations, 
innovative entrepreneurs canjoin professional financial investors in paving a 
tremendous success and improving the macro institutional factors. 
ix 
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The industrial analysis on China venture capital industry will exemplify how 
the following institutional factors can be improved and moulded by foreign direct 
investment and institutionalised venture capital industry which tapped the China 
market: 
1. stage of economic development; 
2. government regulatory framework and policies; 
3. source of domestic funding and financing; 
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4. local business practices and norms; and 
5. capital market structure. 
Several institutional factors including (1) regulatory changes, (2) participation 
ofinstitutional investors as well as (3) increasing maturity of the industry itself 
propelled the development of venture capital industry in the more developed 
countries. A similar set of industry growth drivers and development trend also 
evidenced in Asia Pacific and China. This illustrated the importance of institutional 
factors in shaping economic development and business growth. 
All these post-Crisis changes in institutional factors that significantly altered 
the Asian investment climate render Asian the dreamland for venture capitalists who 
have been stereotyped by Mr David Hartford, the ChiefInvestment Officer ofPioneer 
Poland Fund, as "unlikely people financing unlikely things in strange places and 
interesting times”. 
Lessons to Leam and Message to Deliver 
To have a meaningful and more focused analysis on how venture capital 
industry evolves in this Asian emerging market, the author will focus the report scope 
at Mainland China and seek to dissect China's peculiar institutional factors. 
Venture capitalists, in fact, started tapping the Chinese market since 1980's 
and have since then changed a number of China institutional factors in making China 
a better place for foreign investors. This report seeks to analyse the underlying drivers 
xi 
and growth factors of foreign direct investment in China which nourished the venture 
capital industry. 
The main purposes of this report are, 
1. explore development history of venture capital industry and highlight 
their evolution in Asia Pacific. 
2. conduct a structural analysis on China venture capital industry, to look 
into drivers and inhabitants for the industry's growth in China. 
3. develop a set of critical success factors for venture capitalists tapping the 
China market. 
After charting an after-the-fact re-cap of the industry's milestones and its 
contributions to the emerging economies, the author will supplement this with 
structural analysis for this industry using Michael Porter's industrial analysis model. 
The author also seek to devise a road-map for a 21st century model venture capital 
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Venture capital is a specialised investment product originally pioneered in the 
United States (which could be dated back to 1946). In the world's more developed 
economies, venture capital financing is an important source ofexpansion capital for 
start-up, private middle-market, and even public firais. The author will analysis how 
the industry players could "ride" the liquidity squeeze in the post-Asian financial 
crisis era which suffocates the region's once-impetus emerging businesses. 
The author will focus the report scope & look into issues that shape the growth 
ofventure capital industry in China by conducting an industry analysis covering 
1. entrepreneur's requirements for expansion capital in the post-crisis era, 
2. trends of China foreign direct investments, and 
3. lessons leamed from evolution of venture capital industry in more 
matured markets, 
Based on the above analysis, the author will propose recommendations on 
1. Critical success factors for venture capital house operating in China, 
2. Model venture capital investing house, and 
3. Road-map for a 21 st Century Model Investment House. 
In devising this strategic plan for a venture capital house investing into China, 
the following Chinese peculiarities will be analysis and associated, namely, (1) China 
investment horizon, (2) regulatory restrictions and concerns, as well as (3) domestic 




Over the past decade, business and economic environment of China have been 
developing at tremendous pace which is in line with China's rapid economic reform 
and growth. This is further exemplified by (as recapped from the China Statistics 
Year books) the growth of China retail market at an average growth of 18% during 
1985 - 1996 ——way ahead of the 11% average inflation rate for the period. 
In this report, the author seeks to exemplify how the following institutional 
factors can mould the growth of an emerging industry and industry practices: 
1. stage of economic development; 
2. government regulatory framework and policies; 
3. source of domestic funding and financing; 
4. local business practices and norms; and 
5. capital market structure. 
All these institutional changes could be illustrated in the course ofhighlighting 
the history offoreign investors and venture capitalists establishing their China 
business outposts. 
China market has long been perceived to offer considerable room for growth 
and its attractiveness comes fi:om: » 
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1 • China's 1.2 billion strong population with 60% of its populace below the age of 
351; 
2. one of the region's highest economic growth potential; and 
3. one ofthe region's highest household saving rate (1997 gross national saving 
amounted to 38.6% ofGNP as reported by the Asian Development Bank), 
Over the past decade, business and economic environment ofChina have been 
developing at tremendous pace which is in line with China's rapid economic reform 
and growth. This is exemplified by its domestic retail sales which exhibited an 
average growth of 18% during 1985 -1996 -— way ahead of the 11 % average 
inflation rate for the period. 
Under the dynamic and volatile post-Asian Financial Crisis (“Post-Crisis，，） 
era, Chinese enterprise (both domestically-owned and foreign-invested) encountered 
unreasonable hurdles in raising expansion capital and even daily working capital. The 
liquidity squeeze after the Asian Financial Crisis and the fear ofRenminbi devaluation 
retarded the enthusiasm of foreign direct investment in China. 
The author does not intend to have a detailed discussion on Renminbi stability, 
however, the author still recognises the importance of currency stability (and strength) 
in determining a country's global competitiveness. The following grid tabulates some 
important forces shaping the Renminbi stability and lays the founder-stone to precede 
other discussions on macro-economic issues that follows in this report. 
1 China Statistics Yearbook 1997 indicated that 60% of the Chinese populace 
is below age of35. (Unless otherwise stated, all China-related statistic information is 
recapped from the China Statistical Yearbook of respective years.) 
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• 細 關 州 顯 
I O ^ o t e 2) 0 China does not have full immunity from Asian 
Not immune from Asian Financial Crisis. Falling international 
Finandai Crisis competitivencss iesulting from its strong "currency" 
will lead to slower growth from decreasing exports 
and foreign direct investment. 
Losing intemationai �Forc ign diicct investment will be squeezed b y 
competitiveness recession in Asia . T h e March 1999 EIU country 
report indicated more than 68.1% of the 1998 actual 
FDI is sourced from within Asian investors (1997 -
75.5%). According to China Daily, actual FDI 
increased by only 0.67% in 1998. 
Common fear of currency Q There is a fcaT of cuTTency deflatioH in China among 
delation the intemational investment community. This 
threat not solely comes from lack of internal 
demand, but also due to chronic oversupply. 
Threat intensified by 0 Escalation in uncmployment would heighten this 
accelerating unemployment , ^ . ^ . , 丄 ry^ ,i ••. 
threat if social unrest emerges. The authonties may 
seek to avoid social unread by currency deflation. 
Moreover, effectiveness of other tools (essentially 
the interest rates) for stimulating growth is in doubt. 
Devaluation as a tool to aid • We expect fuTthcr inteiest rate cuts. But only 
soE & banking reform devaluation will cicate the room in which S O E and 
bank sector reforms can proceed. 
Political difficulty ofpainfui Q Thc govemment is facing a devaluating dilemma: 
economic choice - - , • ^, i 
dangerously slow economic growth or a weaker 
currency. Faced with the alternatives, Renminbi 
devaluation appears to be inevitable. 
2 Smyth, Philip & Neilson, Graham. "The Renminbi fall is inevitable". 
Paribas Asian Equity Research. February 9, 1998. 
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In this vulnerable post-Crisis business environment, venture capitalists could 
provide valuable strategic advice and other value-added services to these enterprises. 
On a going-forward basis, the venture capitalists can 
1. work together with entrepreneurs as a value-adding business partner, 
2. bring additional diversity of management insights to the investee 
companies; and 
3. to optimise the sourcing and application of expansion capital over time. 
They could also provide the much-needed expansion capital to sustain China's 
economic growth. These venture capitalists and other foreign investors started 
tapping the Chinese market since 1980s and have injected vast financial resources and 
technical know-hows to improve the competitiveness of China.. 
Foreign Direct Investments in China in the 1990s |^ Cum.FDi| 
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The foreign direct investments in China increased only increased by an 
unsatisfactory 5.5% to US$24.2 billion during the first six months ended June 1998. 
(As a comparison, the 1997 foreign direct investment in China increased by an 
impressive 8.5% to US$51.7 billion when compared to that of 1996.) This can be due 
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to the worsening cost-competitiveness of China to other developing countries, 
especially its Asia Pacific rivals in the post-Crisis arena. 
The author, however, believes "buying into weakness, building the muscle 
during tough times，，is the best strategy in preparation of fruition for the next 
economic upswing. 
This report seeks to analyse the underlying drivers and growth factors of 
foreign direct investment in China which nourished the venture capital industry. 
The main purposes of this report are, 
1. Explore development history of venture capital industry and highlight 
their evolution in Asia Pacific. 
2. Conduct a simple structural analysis on China venture capital industry, to 
look into drivers and inhabitants for the industry's growth in China. 
3. Develop a set of critical success factors for venture capitalists tapping the 
China market. 
4. Devise a road-map for the 21st century model venture capital investment 






Literature review and interviews are the basic methodology adopted & seek to cover: 
1 • the historical developments of the venture capital industry; 
2. practical experience of venture capitalists tapping the China market; 
3. lessons learned on making direct investments in China; and 
4. other institutional factors that shape the industry's development. 
Michael Porter's industrial analysis model will be used to guide the dissection 
of China venture capital industry peculiarities. Porter's models fits perfectly well in 
free-market economies characterised by minimal government & policy interventions. 
This is not the case for China and the author will propose refinements to compliment 
the Porter model in performing industry analysis for China venture capital industry. 
The author will supplement and rationalise research findings by his own job-
related knowledge and practical experience in the venture capital industry. The author 
would like to extend his warmest appreciation and gratitude to all his friends working 
directly or indirectly in the venture capital (direct investment) business and the 
securities sector. They shared valuable advice in refining the author's ideas as well as 




Foreign Direct Investment in China 
China remained relatively unexplored from the western economy prior to 
Deng's 1978 open door policy. Since 1979, the State Planning Commission 
promulgated various incentive measures to (1) attract foreign direct investment 
("FDI") in light industry & outward processing operations, and (2) promote exports. 
Foreign investors have since then painstakingly, and sometimes painfully, 
explored and tapped the China market. These foreign investors are now rethinking 
their strategies in a bid to keep up with intensifying competition in China's domestic 
market. 
This chapter recaps ground-breaking milestones (including the 1990's 
National Industrial Policy Framework and 1995's Investment Catalogue) for FDI in 
China to let the readers acquire an adequate understanding on China's economic 
structure peculiarities and investment landscape. The author will touch a bit on the 
9th Five-Year Plan which presented the central government's sketch for China's 
economic structural in the 21st century. 
The author seeks to illustrate the institutional factors affecting the foreign 
investors investing into China. The same set of factors also shapes the model ofhow 
venture capitalists are doing business in China. This will serve as the foundation for 
the author's analysis of the China venture capital industry that follows in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 6. 
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Running business and investment projects is nothing to do with 
"risk-elimination”, it concerns “risk-management: 
Managing risk is to reduce and mitigate risks to tolerable level 
China, a representative emerging market, is the battlefieldfor 
exercising such sophisticated risk-management skills. 
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Overview 
It is impossible to prepare an exhaustive list of considerations and decision 
criteria underlying entrepreneurs' overseas expansion motives. Knowing that China 
has been ranked consistently by the World Bank as the world's second largest 
recipient for foreign direct investments, the author recapped some ‘basic, ideas below 
as a prelude to our forthcoming "East meets West story". This also serves to facilitate 
our subsequent analysis on China's competitiveness in attracting foreign direct 
investments: 
E a ^ r o j ^ ^ Q f f l y 2 Q | Attractions Inhibitors 
I O v e r s e a s 0 emerging economies offers o political instability 
ExDansion & higher growth potential o different local business 
� ， 1 ^ � i 0 utilise idle production capacity practices 
Market Share ^y penetrating untapped 
overseas market ahead of 
competitors 
Cost 0 access to cheaper low labour o higher management team 
Competitiveness costs and other factors of f^P^rtise &staff tumover 
production o lower labour quality and 
0 secure a new & steady supply productivity 
of raw material 
Establish overseas 0 building new overseas start-of- o investee countries may lack 
Droduction base art production facilities can be the infrastructure to support 
cheaper than upgrading business growth (may be 
existing plants at home underdeveloped capital 
0 to reinforce globalisation of market, banking systems and 
the enterprise and build legal enforcement) 
distribution channels abroad 
Strategic 0 well-charted global strategy in o different standard of legal 
Considerations promoting global presence framework 
0 cross-border tax and 
accounting compilations 
0 uncertain currency risks 
As we are moving towards a 21'^  century global marketplace, our economic 
hinterland, China, shall also be prepared to compete with other developing countries 
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for international investment capital. Before moving to a dissection of"foreign direct 
investments in China", let's spare some time and take a look at the following table 
which captures the fundamental differences and similarities that mould investment 
sentiments in China and the Eastem bloc countries respectively: 
m n m m | [ m m r o | m | Chma East Europe Bloc (“ER，，） 
iInvestment Stage China is more developed ER is in a less developed 
and Investment with keen competition. stage (say, currency 
Cycle Investment cycle typically convertibility) and 
within 3 -10 years. investment cycle typically 
in order of 7 -15 years 
Free Market Market dominated by Completely different mind-
Orientation (overseas) Chinese set. ER people are still 
businessmen who are learning the profit- and 
profit-conscious, productivity-oriented 
supplemented by fractured mentality. 
SOEs. 
Management / Chinese management ER no established 
Ownership philosophy tends to call for entrepreneur / family 
a stable management team, ownership structure. 
Early sign of emergence of Enterprises are loosely 
locally grown owned by employees, 
entrepreneurs & management or 
conglomerates. privatisation flmds. 
Investee management should pass through the following 
sharing test: Will they identify themselves with venture 
capitalists and share with them the investee company's 
-strategic direction and positioning 
-corporate business information 
-management & operations control, and 
-upside ofbusiness success 
Deal Sourcing Asian families and wealthy ER is more complicated 
(affected by ownership individuals aie increasing (individuals with 
structure) important source of deals. established relations with 
SOE could be an important 
source of deals). 
Overall Regulatory"""Chinese legal and ER legal system more 
Business enforcement system better gloomy & dark i.e. less 
Framework developed. transparent. 
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Q j ^ m [ m f f l ^ ^ m | China East Europe Bloc ("ER") 
Political / All are taking transitions from centrally planned 
Economic Factors economy to free market economy with China taking a 
prominent lead. 
China perceived to be more ER being a carryover of 50 
politically stable (investing - 70 years' communist rule 
in Asia is considered more exhibited a general 
of a country risk rather propensity to resist 
than a regional risk). extensive changes and 
reform. 
Information Flow Both lack typical Westem channels for obtaining 
information but China is on the lead when compare to 
ER. (Maintain business contacts and talking with local 
people seemed to be the optimal alternative in both 
cases.) 
Industry Growth / Domestic official statistics may be misleading and 
GDP Statistics sometimes unable to capture all economic activities (due 
to existence ofblack / grey markets). 
Source of Capital China is known for its high ER is less attractive in this 
and Growth saving rate & low overseas regard. 
Potential borrowings. 
Investment Chinese securities markets ER must rely on trade sales 
Realisation are better defined with Q^o LBOs, MBOs or IPOs 
more liquid stock market. for the time being.) 
However, artificial market 
segmentation (A & B 
shares) can be a potential 
hazard to foreign investors. — 
To have a better understanding on the decision criteria commonly adopted by 
institutional investors in evaluating an overseas expansion project, let's share a bit on 
how some of the region's renowned professional investment advisors think: 
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^ ^ ^ f f i Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | Investment Rational Investment Investment 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 Concerns Criteria 
I p s J o t e )^ 0 emerging&fastgrowmg o political stability Not mentioned 
, more-developed o standard of legal 
N . Cross of3i plc economies framework not 
(UK) meeting investor 
expectation 
A. Holzapfel of 0 high growth potential o less-stable economic o relation to 
Siemens A G when compared to the &political authoritiw& 
( p � US/ European saturated development market 
(Cjermany) market o increasing labour o management 
0 relative cheaper labour cost competence 
cost 0 complicated and 
less-transparent tax / 
legal system 
Andrew Kim Sit of o for higher returns o management team Not mentioned 
Kim Investments ° more co-investment turnover 
^ TQ� opportunities (Ub) 
Q TuelingS of o asset allocation guided by o diverse market Not mentioned 
Merifin (Europe) splendid growth o f m ^ l i c ^ d & 
potentials fragile character 
T. Schwartz of 0 strong flindamentals of o experience of local o management 
Venture Capital Asian economies investment competence 
compared to other profession o track record 
Management emerging market (say, o personaltrust 
(US) Latin America and 
Russia) 
C. Wimsett ofWest 0 forpotentialhigher o managementteam o management 
Midland CUS) capital growth & retums stability competence 
� ) 0 track record 
Now we shall have grasped some basic ideas on determinants offoreign direct 
investments and we may move to track what China has done in the past and how well 
they were doing in attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the domestic economic 
growth. 
3 Asia Pacific Private Equity Conference, December 1995. 
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China Industrial Development & Invitation to Foreign Investors 
Driving force for China's industrial development 
China's industrialised development since 1980s are essentially result of the 
following changes in China's institutional factor:-
1. China remained relatively unexplored from the westem economy prior to 
Deng's 1978 open door policy. With a diverse geographic territory and 
huge population, China's resources are remained undeveloped and 
unexplored. 
2. With the introduction of"Open Door policy", China started compiling its 
“First Chapter" of foreign direct investments. 
3. The emergence ofbusiness opportunities in the under-developed Chinese 
economy lead to a large influx of foreign investment, of which most are 
coming from Asia Pacific countries and overseas Chinese (and a majority 
of investments are channelled through Hong Kong). 
4. Lots of Hong Kong businessmen brought with them management 
knowledge, manufacturing technology and expansion capital to invest in 
China. They pioneered and unleashed China's latent productivity as well 
as mobilised its workforce. 
5. A significant portion of Hong Kong-based factories were relocated to or 
started setting up branch factories in coastal Guangdong province to make 
use ofChina's abundant and the then relatively cheaper labour, land and 
other natural resources. 
Evolution of China's industrial policy 
In light of the vast diversity in geographic area and regional cultural barriers 
(mind-set differences )，a well-defined national industrial policy could be useful in 
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guiding (not allocating) resources allocation for economic reform. Another Chinese 
structural peculiarity that naturally calls for a national-wide regulated industrial policy 
is its delicate social and economic balance which is too weak to withstand rapid 
reform or sudden influx of investment capitals and imported products. 
The classic idea of"Four Modernisation" is too vague to be an effective 
policy-guiding tool for industrial development in China. The author thinks this idea at 
most serves only as a slogan. Instead of only paying lip-services to develop its 
economy, the Chinese government adopted many conductive policies to siphon 
foreign investment money. 
To envisage how industrial policy can help smoothen the economic reform, we 
could start this by charting China's industrial development history. 
China's industrial structure suffers a serious shortage of efficient infrastructure 
services as well as a scarcity of which China known as “Basic Industry (or Pillar 
Industry)" which essentially includes production inputs such as the raw material, fuel, 
energy and production equipment used by heavy industry. 
Prior to 1979, a low level of investment in these sectors was caused mainly by 
(1) absence of capital and ineffective central planning as well as (2) unplanned 
allocation ofgovemment resources. Starting from 1979，the State Planning 
Commission introduced various measures (as part of the open door policy) to 
1. Attract foreign investment in light industry & outward processing 
operations 
2. Promoting exports 
3. Decentralising trade and investments to the provincial level 
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This "Open Door’，policy was well accepted with overwhekning success in its 
early years. However, the early success missed out adequate development of 
infrastructure services and pillar industries. During 1979 to 1993, industrial sector 
accounted for 52.8% of total foreign investments which investment in sectors such as 
transport, postal services, telecommunications and electric power industry accounted 
to only 1.6%. This created an economic development bottleneck. 
Moreover, lack of co-ordination between national industrial and foreign 
investment policies led to repetitive imports of production equipment which were left 
idle and led to diseconomies of scale (as exemplified by China's automobile industry 
which suffered from over-capacity since 1990s). 
China's Framework ofNational Industrial Policies in the 1990s 
In 1992, the State Planning Commissions began researching a new industrial 
policy and announced in 1994，the "Framework ofNational Industrial Policies in the 
1990s’，. This policy aims at building a solid industrial foundation for sustainable 
long-term economic growth and policy guidelines for foreign investment and 
economic management. 
This policy has three distinct features: 
1. Govemment policies are re-directed to cultivate pillar industries replacing 
the bias towards the southern and eastem coastal regions in general; 
2. Attempts to direct and encourage foreign investments into bottleneck 
industrial sectors (such as transportation and energy sectors) as well as to 
the inner and westem regions; and 
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3. Aims at improving the country's industrial structure by achieving 
economies of scale and co-ordinating the industrial policies of the 
different provinces. 
To further strengthen the de-bottle-necking process and guide foreign 
investment capital and technology to less-developed industrial and services sectors, a 
Foreign Investment Catalogue was issued in June 1995 (and minor revision in January 
k 
1998). This provided a list of project areas which foreign investment is classified 
"encouraged", “restricted，or "prohibited" (with foreign investment generally 
"permitted" in projects which are not listed). 
The 1998 revision reflected China's current economic planning policies and 
tied to approval procedure for foreign investment and preferential treatment. The 
1998 new sector emphasis was advanced technology and development ofkey basic 
machinery and parts using new / advanced manufacturing technology. 
China's Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) 
The State Planning Commission announced the following industries to be the 
preferentially developing sectors in the ninth Five-Year Plan ("FYP"): 
1. Agriculture; 
2. Pillar industries (infrastructure & basic industrial construction) 
3. Light industries; and 
4. Tertiary (service) industries. 
I 
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During this FYP period, the State government will investment not less than 
US$1,000 billion with more than US$600 billion siphoned into aforementioned key 
national sectors. 
In the agriculture field, the state will increase investment in construction of 
agricultural water conservancy facilities, promulgated regulations to protect the 
farmlands, develop agricultural technology to boost production output, consolidate 
fertiliser manufacturing industry, upgrade forestry and development of rural economy. 
State investment in agriculture sector will exceed US$34 billion. 
Railway transportation capacity will be improved during the period. An 
integrated national-wide transportation network will also be established. For the 
telecommunication sector, the State will establish a national optical-fibre based 
telephone network. There are also aggressive plans to improve the urban telephone 
network by utilising digitised telephone exchange system and satellite communication 
techniques. 
The State will allocate additional resources to enhance competitiveness ofthe 
nation's pillar industry. Additional government resources will be spared for the 
development and strengthening of machinery, electronic, petrochemical, automobile, 
architecture and construction material industries. 
Light manufacturing industry will re-align its product structure, attain 
consistent product quality and re-engineer production process. As for the tertiary 
industry, the State will seek to strengthen regulatory framework for financial, 
insurance and real estate sectors. 
The FYP is in fact an aggressive blue-print for China's national re-engineering 
project which sees to re-define and ftoher develop the country's competitive 
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advantages & core competency. The government will re-prioritise and spearhead its 
financial and other resources to refuel the economic growth momentum. The most 
important part of the FYP is a co-ordinated country-wide re-deployment of resources 
and efforts to fortify its economic structure and set up a platform for China's march 
into the 21st century marketplace. 
Declining Attraction to Foreign Investors? 
Since the Open Door Policy in the 1980s, China exhibited phenomenal success 
in drawing foreign direct investments. Such investments mainly from Hong Kong / 
Taiwan and increasing from other Asian countries as well as US and Europe. This 
greatly improved the China domestic economic structure and efficiency and fuelled 
China's tremendous GDP growth in recent years. 
Foreign Direct Investments in China in the 1990s mcum. FDi 
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To maintain China's attractiveness to FDI amid increasing competition from 
other developing countries, especially in the post-Crisis arena, China need to further 
improve its investment climate. 
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It is undeniable that triggering factor drawing this huge foreign direct 
investment in the early 1980s is China's cost competitiveness. Nowadays, China is 
gradually losing its lustre in cost competitiveness to other developing countries. 
However, China can still leverage its position ofhaving a vast domestic market which 
has been predominately untapped by foreign products. 
"AT Keamey" and "Business China"^ conducted a Survey in 1998 and 
identified that 69% of foreign corporations making direct investments in China 
already based on "revenue factors，’ (i.e. the magnificent China and Asian Pacific 
market). The remaining 31% corporations are having their China direct investments 
initiatives driven by “cost factors" (i.e. lower labour costs and abundant supply of raw 
material). 
Cooling of the China Mania 
China is losing its cost-leadership to other developing countries. The foreign 
direct investment in China, after reaching its peak in early 1990s，appears to losing its 
growth momentum. Since 1985, the contracted FDI in China is diminishing gradually 
and the early-90s China Fever is cooling down apparently. 
The author believe such "cooling" is partly come from China's deliberate 
strive to regulate the massive influx of foreign investments in order to control its 
rising inflation in the early 1990s. The 1994 national-wide austerity program 
characterised by a series credit-tightening procedures and implementation ofnew tax 
4 "The Path to Profit". Business China June 8，1998: 1-3. 
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regulations to discourage speculative foreign (as well as domestic) investments in 
China's then overheat real estate sectors. 
The most important and positive result after the China-boom “cooling” is the 
improvement in investment quality. In light of the decline growth in foreign direct 
investment to China, the conventional wisdom claiming the loss of investors' interest 
in China may not be conclusive. The investment made by large multinational 
corporations (say, the Fortune 500 companies and other niche market leaders) to 
China has never been stopped. We can see the big household names like chemical 
leaders Amoco, Exxon, Rohm & Haas，Rhone Poulenc, BASF, retail giants Makor, 
Carrefour, Wal-Mart, and other international household names such as American 
Standard, Glaxo, Pirelli, and Lafarge all established their presence in China. 
Despite a recent decrease in foreign direct investment, this China mania is still 
evidenced by the increase in the "average size of an FDI contract". During the earlier 
days (from 1990 to 1994), the size per foreign investment project is US$1.3 million 
while that in the later stage (from 1995 onwards) increased to US$2.6 million. The 
author believes the foreign investors have becoming more cautious and more 
organised in tapping the China market. They endeavour to demonstrate their long-
term commitment to building a market presence in China and Asia. The foreign 
investors are no longer small-to-medium size firms attracted to China by its low-cost 
factors of production. The foreign investors are prepared to have a long-term warfare 
and make themselves ready for competition in the 2T^ century global marketplace. 
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Average Size ofFDI Contract (1990 - June 1998) 
qjSD million) 
Year No. of Contracted Value per 
Contracts Value contract 
1990 7,200 6,600 0.92 
1991 12,900. 11,900 0.92 
1992 48,700 58,100 1.19 
1993 83,400 111,400 1.34 
1994 47,500 81,400 1.71 
1995 37,000 91,300 2.46 
1996 24,500 73,200 2.98 
1997 21,000 51,800 2.47 
1998 * 9,600 24,200 2.52 
Source: MOFTEC 
* 1998 figure is six-month figure ending June 1998 
The declining FDI growth also implied less investment projects are concluded 
in a hasty manner without commissioning adequate feasibility studies as in the early 
1990s. Undisclosed source from MOFTEC in Beijing indicated many FDI contracts 
entered into in the heydays of early 1990s have never been realised. The contracting 
parties arejust unable to enforce such contracts for fundamental problems including 
inadequate financial resources, undesirable domestic cost structure and unanswered 
doubts on product acceptability, all these are fundamental problems which can be 
avoided by conducting some basic pre-acquisition due diligence. 
Investment Rationale and Concerns for China Direct Investments 
The 1998 AT Keamey / Business China reported the top five priorities and top 
five constraints affecting profitability in China are: fPercentage in bracket indicates 
percentage of survey respondents ranking this element “top five concerns" in their 
response.) 
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m Top Five Priorities Top Five Constraints 
• Employee development / • Intensified price competition 
management localisation (69%) 
(72%) 
• Improve distribution systems / • Lack of quality local 
customer access (61 %) management (67%) 
• Strengthen management • Weaker than expected market 
control (58%) growth (59%) 
• Capture greater market share • Increasing competitive 
(43%) environment (52%) 
• Improve management quality • Deteriorating accounts 
(42%) receivable issue (46%) 
The Paradigm Change for China Direct Investment 
Another interesting finding revealed by this survey is a "paradigm shift". 
When foreign investors started tapping the China market since 1978，they 
place much emphasis on choosing a domestic JV partner. The forces driving this 
mentality are: 
1. foreign firms have limited legal right to own property and employ local 
staff, 
2. lack of a mature legal system to deal with contractual agreements; and 
3. bureaucratic swamp the foreign investors must beat when starting 
business in China. 
The last two reason encourage firms to join forces with a partner who make 
use of their political power as well as economic power. Other reasons calling for 
having a Chinese partner is for better access to market, local know-how & know-who 
(Guanxi). 
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However, some fundamental cultural differences existing between thejoint 
venture partners. Some of these fundamental differences include: 
Chinese System Westem System 
Business objective o "productive efficiency" o profitability 
Budget 0 planning and authorisation o performance evaluation 
motivation 
Financial o report to govemment (e.g. o protect minority 
reporting tax & planning bureau) and shareholders / creditors 
central planning agencies 
Management o simple & ignored by o an important accounting 
Accounting mainstream accountants field 
Due to the cultural differences and sometime, hidden agenda of thejoint 
venture partners, we see a declining popularity of using JV as a PRC investment 
vehicle. We saw JV's share within total FIE approvals decline from 77% in 1993 to 
55% in 1997 while that for WFOE increased from 23% in 1993 to 45% in 1997. 
New FIE Approvals 
% ofFIE Approval 
Year Total FIE WFOE JV 
1991 12,900 21% 79% 
1992 48,700 18% 82% 
1993 83,400 28% 77% 
1994 47,500 27% 73% 
1995 37,000 32% 68% 
1996 24,500 37% 63% 
1997 21,000 45% 55% 
Key 
Source: MOFTEC FIE Foreign-invested enterprise 
WFOE Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprise 
JV Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures 
This is further illustrated by the A T Keamey 1998 China Survey which 
revealed more than 60% of the WFOE enterprise are profitable while only 40% of JVs 
are profitable in 1997. This same research also revealed, somewhat startling, past 
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experience of foreign investors dealing with their local partners. As many as 22% of 
the survey respondent indicated that they have pulled from at least one Sin-foreign 
joint venture co-investment projects. 
<^<<"-^  ~~>~«v^  ^ Reason for Pulling Out 
Have not puH^ d"^  ^ \ ^ Z ^ 
out from iv^ 78% ^ \ ^ 
/ \ ^ ^ ^ ^ 440/0 olackofprofitability 
/ \ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ® i 
^^^^^^^^^m 
\ ^^f^^^^^Sf 0 change in strategic direction -
V >/^  S^^ **fe^ Sr JV no longer a core business 
^^ y^ ^^ j^r 56% 0 partner changes business scope 
^^^ y/" ^ ^ \ 0 regulatory issues 
Have pulled^!>4 ,, ^ ^ ^ \ �poor partner relationship 
from JVs: 22% ^ 
The author believes the foreign investors are more willing to be ‘‘on their own’’ 
in tapping the Chinese domestic market as the rule of game has became more 
“impersonal” as exemplified by 
1. more levelled playing field for the foreign investors (and domestic players 
as well) in terms ofgovernment intervention and industrial policy; 
2. more transparent and predictable legal (and legal enforcement) system. 
We also sec a more consistent government policies and more open 
government technocratic who are willing to exchange ideas and reach 
consensus with foreign investors; 
3. both the local and foreign business players have become niorc willing to 
listen to each other and align their difference: and 
4. after opening o f the “China market” for two decades, we see emergence of 
the first batch ofscasoned China locally brought-up business executives 
who could effectively bridge the difference in China and foreign business 
practices 
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This idea is also shared by a number of professional advisors. “Thou shall not 
Joint venture, !，，warned Charles Stevens, a partner ofleading U. S. law firm 
Freshfields, at the November 1997 Asian M&A Forum. 
During this seminar, Stevens even proposed his “ Ten Commandments of 
China Direct Investment，，with "Don't，Joint Venture" as the utmost important and 
flmdamental commandment. 
m L Don'tjoint venture. 
2. Don't license too much. 
3. Don't forget the whole picture. 
4. Don't forget you are foreign. 
5. Don't bribe. 
6. Don't employ forever. 
7. Don't forget to audit. 
8. Don't evade taxes. 
9. Don't neglect language difficulties. 
10. Don't ignore the local courts. 
Source: Charles Stevens, Partner, Freshfields. 1997. 
Stevens holds a strong negative attitude towards entering into ajoint venture 
agreement with a local partner who is actually a competitor in the field. If one must 
joint venture, Stevens stressed the importance of not so doing permanently or 
sincerely. Entering into ajoint venture with a competitor is a very long-term 
commitment. If one is unfortunate enough to make such a commitment, make sure 
that the co-operation documents allow re-evaluate of this commitment once every five 
or ten years. He also warned foreign investors to think of escape and considerjoint 
ventures, at best, like a temporary marriage with a strong pre-nuptial agreement. 
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In terms ofmanaging relationship with Chinesejoint venture partners, some of 
Steven's suggestions are quire inspirational. He advised foreign investors "not to 
forget the whole picture". In China, joint venture partners usually have affiliations 
with other companies dealing in such things as raw materials, distribution contracts 
and financing services. The foreign investments are actually a way of taking out 
profit from these areas. He explicitly warned foreign investors to look out for hidden 
agenda for the domestic joint venture partners. 
How to Maintain China's Competitiveness to Foreign Investors 
The author believes if China have to maintain its competitiveness in the 21st 
century battle for foreign investments, it should improve the following institutional 
factors 
1. maintain a stable economic and political environment, 
2. offer a favourable operating condition and business environment, and 
3. post a transparent government policy 
4. eliminate government involvement in commercial sector 
If China can successfully improving its attractiveness in these areas, it could 
stand a far better chance to secure additional foreign direct environment. The author 
recaps the important milestones for these changes in institutional factor and briefly 
commented their importance in sustaining foreign investments. 
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1. Stable Economic and Political Environment 
The influx ofFDI to China, apart from fuelling economic growth, also created 
a platform for the China government to introduce various revolutionary reforms on, 
say, SOEs, taxation, banking system, legal and regulatory framework, securities 
market, and foreign exchange systems. All these constitute a more efficient playing 
field for both the foreign investors as well as domestic corporations. 
A number of these reforms are well received by the market and stood with 
tremendous progress and success while other are still underway and may encounter 
massive resistance and problems. 
Some of these more successful and prominent reforms include: 
Legal Services 
The Chinese government takes a cautious approach in opening the domestic 
legal services sector to foreign investors. Since 1992，there are 15 cities where 
foreign law firms are allowed to set-up offices. As of end of 1998，93 foreign law 
firms have already built their outposts in these 15 Chinese cities. The Chinese 
government, however, forbids these Chinese law firms from employing domestic 
lawyers or furnishing legal opinions for Chinese statue laws and regulations^ 
5 "China Service Industry “. China Trade Post September, 1998: 6. 
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Taxation & Accounting 
To track the results of numerous taxation and accounting reforms in China, the 
following table is prepared 
Year Milestones 
Pre-1985 stage “Fund accounting” financial reporting framework as adopted 
from the classic Soviet system. 
1985 Adoption of the Accounting Regulation for the PRC Sino-
Foreign Joint Ventures. 
1988 Formation of China Institute of Certified Public Accounts. A 
task force team is also formed in the Ministry ofFinance to 
oversee the development ofPRC accounting standards. 
1991 The first PRC exposure draft of "Accounting Standards for 
Business entities No. 1” was released by the Ministry ofFinance. 
1992 The Accounting Regulations for Joint Stock Limited Liabilities 
Companies became effective in January 1，1992. The 
Accounting Regulations for FIEs also became effective since 
July 1992. 
The Big-Six International CPA Firms were allowed to form 
contractual joint ventures with Chinese local CPA firms and 
establish offices in China. 
1993 The Enterprise Accounting Standards became mandatory in July 
1，1993. 
(Before then, Deloitte Touche Tomatsu International secured the 
US$3 million consultancy contract from Ministry ofFinance to 
assist the development of the first-ever PRC GAAP. Various 
exposure drafts for PRC GAAP were released between 1994 -
1996.) 
The China Law of Certified Public Accountants was adopted by 
the National People's Congress in October31, 1993. Later in 
December 29,1993，the China Law of Accounting was also 
adopted. 
1994 PRC Tax system reform being implemented in 1994 and the 
China Law of Auditing was also adopted by the National 
People's Congress. 
Another significant milestone, the China's first Companies Law 
become effective in July 1, 1994. 
* 
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1995 - 1996 Not less than 4 intemational accounting forums were held in 
Beijing to review the 30 exposure drafts for the PRC GAAP. 
From January 1，1996，the ten PRC Auditing Standards as issued 
by Ministry ofFinance became mandatory. 
1997 - 1998 The China's home-grown Auditing Standards are being 
promulgated and additional Chinese accounting standards 
announced. As of October 1998，there are 8 announced 
accounting standards. 
As of end of 1998，there are more than 20 intemational CPA 
firms operating affiliated offices in China. 
The Chinese government demonstrated vigorous efforts in strengthening its 
regulatory financial reporting system in response to continuous influx of foreign 
investment capitals. 
Securities Market 
Shanghai Stock Exchange was officially re-opened for securities dealing in 
December 1990. This marked the first step in revitalising China's securities and 
capital markets. This was followed by the July 1991 official opening of the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Formation of the two exchanges successfully preceded the opening 
ofPRC domestic securities market to foreign investors in a separate board, the B 
shares. The fist B-shares, Shanghai Vacuum，was listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in December 1991. 
To institutionalise the government's efforts to regulate the securities market, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the "CSRC") was set-up in 1992 and 
published a number of disclosure requirements for listed companies since then. 
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Together with the People's Bank of China and the State Council Securities 
Committee, they have been China's securities market watchdog since then^. 
As of end of 1998, China has established five listed & close-ended fund-
management company having "asset under management" ofRenminbi 2 billion each. 
It was well recognised that Chinese government's introduction of investment funds 
signifies its determination to develop a base of institutional investors to smoothen 
future developments of the fledgling domestic securities markets. 
A very significant breakthrough in the China domestic securities market 
regulation is the introduction of the concept of"minority protection". Despite the 
implementation of this concept in China is still at its early stage, much encouraging 
milestones have been shown in the China companies law, securities laws and 
domestic listing rules. Foreign investor participation (or the Chinese government's 
desire to draw foreign investment capital) should be a key element in catalysing these 
positive changes. The author also believes having China domestics companies to 
participate in cross-border securities activities is another catalyst for the introduction 
of"minority protection" in China. (Please refer to Appendix I of this chapter for a 
brief list of"Pioneering Chinese Issuers ofIntemational Equity") 
6 The government endorsed a plan to merge the State Council Securities 
Committee and China Securities Regulatory Commission, sidelining the People's 
Bank of China and forming China's first unified securities market regulator. 
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Banking Industry 
China's domestic banking sector, being foundation of the country's finance 
sector, has long been insulated from foreign competition. The government's direct 
involvement in domestic banking operations rendered this a strict monopoly. The first 
milestone change to the Chinese banking industry crystallised in 1985 when doors 
were opened to foreign banks to set-up their headquarters, branches and Sine-foreign 
joint-venture banks in the special economic zones. Before then, there were only four 
foreign banks allowed to set-up a branch in China (they are the Hong Kong Bank, 
Standard Chartered Bank, Bank ofEast Asia and Overseas Chinese Bank). However， 
NO foreign bank is allowed to engage in retail banking and Renminbi businesses. 
The banking industry overhaul in China can be dated back to 1993 when the 
People's Bank of China abandoned its lending businesses and restructured into 
China's home-grown central bank. This is China's first ever banking regulator which 
paved the road for future banking reforms. 
This also accompanied by Chinese government's 1994 initiates of unifying the 
then two-tier currency system and formation of three new policy banks? thus 
transforming existing state "Big-Four" banks^ into full-fledged commercial banks. 
7 The three policy banks formed in 1994 are (1) State Development Bank of 
China, (2) Agriculture Development Bank of China and (3) Export-Import Credit 
Bank of China. 
8 The "Big-Four Banks" are Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, Agriculture Bank of China and Construction Bank of China who 
collectively account for more than 90% of China's domestic banking assets. 
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The real challenge to domestic banking industry did not realise until late 1996. 
During late 1996 and early 1997, eight foreign banks^ are allowed to handle Renminbi 
transactions in Shanghai's Pudong New Area. The real impact to the domestic 
banking sector is only minimal taking into account the trivial volume ofRenminbi 
business thus generated'®. This was, however, a significant move that indicated 
Chinese government's solid intention to open up the domestic banking sector. A 
healthy Chinese domestic banking sector could serve as a platform to catapult the 
State-Owned Enterprise reform by providing the necessary expansion capital. 
2. Favourable Operating Condition 
The government also makes a number of efforts in improving the overall 
investment climate. The government make extensive investment to improve and 
upgrade the country's infrastructure system (including transportation, and 
telecommunication) to improve the overall operating efficiency ofbusiness entities. 
9 The eight foreign banks are (1) Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, (2) Citibank, (3) 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, (4) Hong Kong Bank, (5) Industrial Bank of Japan, (6) 
International Bank ofParis, (7) Sanwa Bank, and (8) Standard Chartered Bank. 
10 During an interview with Mr. John Beeman, Country Corporate Office of 
Citibank - China on April 24, 1998，Mr. Beeman mentioned that after twelve months 
ofopening up Renminbi business to nine foreign banks, the aggregate Renminbi loans 
and deposits from and to foreign banks amounted only to RMB 519 million and 566 
million respectively. This means foreign banks account for less than 0.005% ofthe 
total Renminbi assets which is total insignificant. 
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(Please refer to following section on China's Ninth Five-Year Plan for additional 
details.) 
The other major difficulty that hampers business development is the lack of 
local credit and funds. The Chinese government is vigilant towards the control of 
money supply and FIEs (as well as other non-privileged domestic borrowers and 
enterprises) are having raising difficulty in raising financing to fund their local 
expansions and operations. In these regards, venture capitalists can help to alleviate 
this capital shortage. 
3. Transparent Government Policy 
To boost foreign investments and let the investors fully understand the 
allowable scope ofbusiness, a transparent government policy on foreign direct 
investments is essential. 
In the past, foreign investors do not know what is their allowed business scope 
within Chinas highly regulated business environment. Foreign investments are thus 
mainly siphoned to manufacturing sectors where government policy is more 
transparent. We can see this trend from the following analysis: 
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The most important step in shaping the increasing policy transparency was 
made in June 1995. The Chinese government issued a set of national guideline on 
foreign investment which lay out specifically, and for the first time in the Chinese 
history, a legal boundary between what is encouraged, restricted and prohibited from 
foreign participation. 
This is the second milestone in shaping China's national industrial policy to 
direct foreign capital to sectors where less-efficient production capability exists. 
Foreign investors are also encouraged to invest in the central and westem China where 
development of these inland provinces lags behind their coastal counterparts. 
On top of this, the guidelines also opened legitimise new frontiers for foreign 
investors. First ever in China's stated government policy, green-lights to foreign 
participation in areas such as nuclear power stations, civil airports and mass transit 
railway is now officially on. For protection of national interest, however, the Chinese 
government reserves majority shareholding in these projects. 
This guideline also explicitly “proclaims” Chinas strategy on utilising FDI to 
bridge the economical gap and social needs for China. It was widely recognised that 
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the Chinese government would like to encourage (1) construction of energy and 
transportation infrastructures which experience gross under-supply and (2) foreign 
investments in the less-developed central and westem part of China. The ultimate 
goal of the guideline is to effect a economic de-bottlenecking to ease the country's 
capacity constraint and further development hurdle resulting from inadequate and 
fragmented infi:astructure and staggered regional development gasp and income 
disparity between the coastal and inland provinces. 
This guideline worked by providing a list of explicate definition of 
encouraged", "restricted" and "prohibited" investment for foreign investors and 
detailed such classification in a "catalogue guiding foreign direct investments". For 
"encouraged" or other allowable investment activities with project size not exceeding 
US$30 million, the coastal provinces, municipal cities, autonomous regions are 
allowed to examine and grant investment approvals to proposed foreign invested 
projects. 
4. Disintegration of Govemment Political and Business Interests. 
丨 Another important milestone is the Chinese governments stated policy to 
disassociate govemment ministries (and other govemment agencies) from political 
and business interests. This is exemplified by the 1998 govemment decree to 
disengage the People's Liberation Army ("PLA") and other armed-forces from 
commercial activities before end of 1998. The PLA managed to attain this stated 
I 
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target on December 15, 1998 ". (See the text box on 999 Group which illustrated 
PLA's effort in fulfilling this government decree.) 
Disintegration ofPolitical and Business Interests 
With response to a government decree, effective December 15, 1998，the 999 
Pharmaceutical Group ("999 Group") was disintegrated form the PLA and held 
themselves accountable to the State Council. 
The 999 Group was a PLA-sponsored profit-oriented business entity and its principal 
operations falls under the umbrella of Southern Pharmaceutical Factory which, 
directly or indirectly, owns more than 100 affiliated companies spanning across Asia 
Pacific and even Russia. This is a diversified business group with 1997 net profit of 
Renminbi 400 million and has actively seeking expansion through an aggressive 
merger and acquisition program. 
The 999 Group commenced operation in 1986 with a Renminbi 5 million bank loan 
granted to PLA and have grown to become a leading Chinese conglomerate of 
diversified business interest with net assets exceeding Renminbi 3.8 billion. 
Hand-over of this high-profile and well-known Chinese conglomerate from PLA to 
the State Council was a ground-breaking event that demonstrated the government's 
commitment to rationalise the domestic commercial market. 
Historically, the PLA is an influential organisation in the Chinese government 
set-up. Apart from a powerful armed force, PLA also has its own representative in the 
State Council and operates numerous business activities under the PLA umbrella and 
11 "No more business activities for China's armed forces". China Economic 
News (a Chinese newspaper published in China). December 15, 1998. 
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have been influential both in the political and commercial arena. By rationalising and 
fracturing this long-established status quo, the government fully demonstrated its 
commitment to rationalise the domestic business environment. This shall be a 
significant breakthrough in establishing a level playground for foreign investors in 
China. In the past, it was not uncommon for PLA (and other government agencies) to 
abuse their superior government connections and power to benefit their business 
operations. 
Earlier in 1998，the Chinese government also promulgated an order to 
restructure^^, mainly through "privatisation" (or "corporatisation") of government 
ministries to 
1. streamline the government operations, 
2. liberalise the market by reducing government involvement in business activities, 
and 
3. avoid conflict of interest for government ministries operating a profit-seeking 
business. 
In the past, foreign investors operating in China are in an unfavourable 
position as they need to deal with their government / statutory regulators who also 
owns business interests in the same field in which they are operating. This regulator 
sets the rule of game, supplies raw material to or purchase end product from this 
12 According to this government decree, 15 ministries (including Ministry of 
Electric Power, Ministry of Internal Trade, State Commission for Economic 
Restructuring) will be abolished, 4 new ministries (including Ministry of State Land 
Resources and Ministry ofInformation Industry) will be established, with 3 other 
existing ministries re-named. 
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foreign-invested enterprise AND compete with it for business and market share. (See 
the following text box for fiuther illustration on this.) 
Conflict of interest to decline (reduced government multiple-level involvement) 
Until 1998, the PRC power industry was principally regulated by the Ministry of 
Electric Power ("MOEP") which prepare sketches China's blueprint in developing its 
power generation network, setting performance goals and safety standard for power 
plants as well as other regulatory requirements. Under this unique Chinese regulatory 
framework, the MOEP demonstrated a multiple-level involvement in the PRC power 
sectors, namely (a) industry regulator, (b) power generator (competing with foreign-
invested independent power producing plants), and (c) sole operator of the nation's 
power distribution networks. 
The early-1998 dismantling of the MOEP and the new China State Power Corporation 
("CSPC") gives a new page to the PC power industry by separating the regulatory 
function from the operational function and brings in market competition to reduce 
conflict of interests arising from MOEP's multiple-level involvement. The State 
Development and Planning Commission has become the sole regulatory agency with 
authority to approve on-grid tariff and new power plant projects. The CSPC become a 
commercial body responsible for owning, operating and managing all state-owned 
power plants and the power distribution network. Although all new projects and tariff 
increase application still need to be discussed and filed with the CSPC and then 
submitted to the SDPC for approval through the CSPC, the CSPC no longer has any 
approval authority. 
This is generally perceived to be a positive move to the development of the Chinese 
power industry by reducing the opportunities for conflicting interests to develop. 
Under a planned market economy system for several decades, the march into 
open market operation could be painful and difficult. It's heartening to know that the 
paradigm has been changed among the government officials who understand and to 
the point of fulfilment, that a market-force based and level business playground is the 
foundation to attract foreign direct investments. 
44 
The Roads Ahead for China 
Some leading economists and sociologists proposed the following 10 salient 
economic and social characteristics" which they believe shall chart-out the roads 
ahead for China. 
They believe amidst the proven tremendous growth potential of China, certain 
risks are inherent and the immediate concerns are 
1. completion of China's economic structural reform, 
2. China's integration with the global economic system, and 
3. how effective is Chinese government in sustaining its economic growth. 
They advocated the following 10 salient Chinese features upon which China's 
home-grown economic development model shall be cultivated are: 
(1) The 15th People ’ s Congress ’ reaffirmation of Deng Xiaoping ’ s reform 
strategy which serve to provide a conceptual framework to guide economic 
reforms. 
(2) China is undergoing a smooth development (the soft landing) given a current 
stable level of commodity and foodstuff price. This gives government 
additional time to strengthen China's fragmented and vulnerable, yet 
important, agriculture system. 
13 "The Prospect of China". Hong Kong Economic Monthly Journal. Vol. 
248. November 1997: 20 - 24 
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(3) Strengthening security markets regulation to sustain market creditability and 
improved risk management. The most challenging part of this package shall 
be the reform of China's debt-ridden state-owned banking sector. 
(4) Further growth of foreign reserve could stabilise the RMB exchange rate and 
provide a stable economic environment to nurture economic growth. 
(5) Rising unemployment shall be properly handled to facilitate massive and 
fundamental SOE reform, 
(6) "Corruption" and "Monopoly" hinders market transformation and potentially 
threatens social stability. 
(7) Structural problem in the consumer market and the inability of financial 
intermediaries to provide "storage of value" to general public. This hinders 
the ability of siphoning personal savings to capital investments. 
(8) Environmental and population problem can drag China's futoe economic 
growth. 
(9) Reunification of HK with China can further propel China's economic and 
political reform and improve China's standing in the international political 
arena. 
(10) China's long-term development is risk-prone and this is a matter of exploiting 
China's 7 growth drivers: 
1 • continuous development of the agricultural sector, 
2. wealth creation resulting from China's structural reform, 
3. efficient utilisation of foreign direct investments and exchange reserve 
4. increased productivity due to adopting of latest manufacturing techniques 
and improved level of education, 
5. mobilisation of idle rural work-force provide a low-cost quality work 
force to maintain China's international competitiveness, 
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6. broadening of China's economic structure, and 
7. reduced economic volatility as the economy matures. 
These growth factors, however, could only be directed to meaningful 
economic growth upon successful attainment of 
1. eradication ofcorruption, 
2. substantiation of market reform and regulation, 
3. economic transformation in the absence of severe environmental problem, 
4. elimination of social unrest and undue credit plunge, and 
5. stable global economy which provides a platform for China's economic 
transformation. 
From the perceptive of a financial investor making strategic investment in 
China, the author considers the following set of growth accelerators and inhabitants 
shall determine China's competitiveness in attracting foreign direct investment and 
shape the direction of its economic development: 
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^ Growth Accelerators Growth Inhibitants 
Re-organisation of government State-Own Enterprise ("SOE") reform 
structure (and economic involvement brings extensive unemployment 
via SOE reform) promote productivity, problem that undermines economic 
eliminate bureaucracy & unnecessary stability and demolishes the platform 
political intervention (as well as for further economic reform, 
corruption). 
Breakthrough of ownership / capital Government financial resources and 
structure reform which nurtures capital foreign capital not adequate to ease 
market development and strengthens financial burden for China's large-scale 
security market regulation. SOE reform & chokes the 
infrastructure investment. 
Increased industrialisation (especially Income disparity & uneven 
in the less-developed rural areas) development between coastal and 
unleashes idle capacity and mobilises inland provinces may cause conflicts 
latent work force. and destructive competition among 
provinces. 
Government and overseas investments Social security, medical and housing 
in infrastructure improve internal reforms that goes hand-in-hand with 
competitiveness which, in tum, fortify the economic structure changes may 
domestic economic structure. invite eruption of abrupt disruption and 
brings about social unrest in both urban 
and rural areas. 
Continuous influx of foreign direct Accentuating population growth and 
investment fuels development of fractured education system worsen 
domestic economy and enhance market labour quality and dampen the 
efficiency / productivity. economy's strive to improve 
production efficiency, thus hurting the 
foreign investors. 
We could see from the above grid (as proposed by the author) that every coin 
has two sides. 
The Chinese government undertakes bold and unprecedented structural 
reforms to build a solid domestic economic platform in the hope of escorting China 
into the 2T^ century global marketplace. All such reforms will bring about a short-
term or medium-term painful social side-effects. These reforms also demand 
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substantial financial as well as government resources to implement. Failures of any of 
these reforms will definitely be devastating. 
This is, in effect, a function of Chinese government's successfulness in 
1. Implementing the various structural reforms (in capital market and legal 
systems) without triggering social unrest 
2. Improving and attaining a balanced development of coastal & inner region 
which fortifies the country's overall efficiency in infrastructure 
3. Illuminating government red-tapes and dissociating government from 
business activities. This will let the market attain its natural equilibrium. 
4. Unleashing latent work-force and properly channelling the mass populace 
into productive economic sectors. 
5. Attracting and channelling foreign direct investment and fuelling this 
financial resources to support China's structural reforms. 
China，s WTO Entry 
Despite China's WTO entry will only be crystallised after satisfactorily 
completion of China's negotiation campaign with all 134 TWO members, we all see 
the momentum of China's strive to WTO entry! After Premier Zhu Rongji's April 
1999 US visit and consequential perception of China's more willingness to open up its 
marketi4，China's WTO entry appears to be more imminent than any time in history! 
14 Say China's April 1999 proposal of allowing foreign equity ownership to 
own not more than 35% in China's domestic telecommunication companies as well as 
the long-awaited liberation of domestic RMB business to all foreign banks within a 5-
year period. (Please see next section for further details.) 
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The WTO entry could anchor China's influence in the global economy as well 
as attaining a more secured access to export markets and increased flow of foreign 
direct investments. All such impacts could bring magnificent long-term growth 
potential to the Chinese economy. This growth momentum is much in need during 
this period of stagnant domestic economic growth. � 
Of curse, all successes come with a price tag! The WTO entry may give rise 
to fierce competition in the domestic market after lifting government protective 
measures (generally favouring domestic companies). This could catalyst the demise 
of China's injured state-own enterprises. (As well as the domestic banking sector -
see below for further elaboration.) 
The most important impact to China upon the WTO entry should be its 
improved position to build-up a multi-facet and multi-lateral platform for China to 
handle cross-border trade disputes and discussions. China's chance ofbeing caught 
and hard-hit by protectionist measures in China's export market are make more 
remote. This could be illustrated by China's more-secured access to the US market. 
US generally grants the “Most Favoured Nation^^" ("MFN") status to the WTO 
members. Instead of undergoing an annual review, China's may then secure a 
permanent MFN status and assure its access to the US market. Similar situations 
could be seen for China's access to other overseas markets. 
15 Now renamed as 'TSFormal Trade Relations". 
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Most ofthe after-WTO entry tariff and market opening will take place in 
phases extending over a considerable period of time, hence there shall only be 
minimal immediate impact on China. The author believes it will take three to five 
years for the WTO entry impact to surface - some of these impacts may be negative. 
Improved trade prospect, domestic economic efficiency and influx of foreign 
expansion capital, however, shall benefit China in the long-term. 
I 
China's World Trade Organisation market access concessions 
China's WTO accession represents an opportunity to “address” a broad range 
of unfair trade practices, trade barriers, discriminatory regulatory processes, lack of 
transparency, and other policies which limit foreign participation in the Chinese 
market or unfairly affect foreign trade. The broad set of commitments China has 
offered, and the substantial negotiations which remain to be held, will advance foreign 
investors' business interests in a fundamental way and make China move towards 
internationally-accepted standards ofbusiness conduct. 
Broadly speaking, the market access commitments China has offered thus far 
will bring China at or above existing WTO standards on issues and sectors of major 
concem to the foreign (in particular the US) investors. These commitments include 
further opening up of the domestic service sectors which cover the broad range of 
sectors, including distribution, value-added telecommunications, insurance, computer 
and business services, environmental services, franchising and direct sales, legal and 
accounting, sound recordings, and entertainment software. These concessions are: 
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Sector Agreement and timing 
AGRICULTURE"""Average agricultural tariffwill fall to 17%. Tariffs on "US 
priority products" to fall even further to 14.5%. China has also 
agreed to cancel its ban on certain wheat, citrus fruit and meat 
imports from the US. All tariff reductions to be phased in by 
2004. The lifting of the ban on wheat, fruit and meat imports is 
effective immediately. 
INDUSTRY Average industrial tariff9.4% (from 24.6% in 1997); 7.1% for~~ 
US priority products (including autos, chemicals and information 
technology). Two- thirds of tariff reductions phased in by 2003; 
the remainder by 2005 with a few exceptions. 
Automotive Tariffs on autos will be lowered to 25% from 80%- 100% at 
present. Average tariff on auto parts to fall to 10%. Auto import 
quotas to be abolished. All by 2005. 
Chemicals China to reduce tariffs on 70% of all imported chemicals to 5.5-
6.5% from 35% at present. 
Information China will reduce tariffs on IT products including 
technology semiconductors, computers, computer equipment and 
telecommunications to zero from an average of 13.3% at present. 
Most IT tariffs eliminated by 2003; remainder by 2005. 
SERVICES 
Audio-visual Still under discussion. But China will allow 49% foreign 
ownership of video and sound recording distribution. Foreign 
majority ownership of cinemas permitted within 3 years of 
accession 
Banking and Still under discussion 
securities 
SERVICES China today is among the markets most closed to services 
exports anywhere in the world. Such concessions include 
Chinese accession to the two major existing multilateral service 
agreements on basic telecommunications and financial services. 
Distribution US firms to be allowed fiill trading and distribution rights within 
3 years of accession for most products (within five for fertilisers, 
crude oil and processed petroleum products). 
* Including direct sales, maintenance, retailing, transportation, 
wholesaling and all auxiliary services 
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Sector Agreement and timing 
Insurance Foreign property and casualty firms to be allowed to insure 
large-scale risks nation-wide upon accession with all geographic 
restrictions phased out within 5 years of accession (and within 2-
3 years in key cities). Foreign insurers allowed to conduct group, 
health and pension services within 5 years. 50% foreign 
ownership oflife insurance JVs upon accession and 51% within 
1 year. 51% foreign ownership of non-life and reinsurance JVs 
upon accession and wholly-owned subsidiaries within 2 years. 
Professional China to allow foreign majority ownership of accounting, 
services architecture, computer-related, dental, engineering, legal 
(Chinese law excepted), management consultancy, medical, 
taxation and urban planning services. 
Telecom- Geographic restrictions to be eliminated on services including 
munications paging (within 4 years of accession), value added (4 years), 
mobile (5 years) and fixed-line (6 years). China will also allow 
49% foreign investment in all services (within 4 years of 
accession) and 51% in value- added and paging (4 years). 
Travel and Majority foreign hotel ownership upon accession and 100% 
tourism within 3 years of accession. No restrictions on foreign operation 
of all travel agency services. 
QUOTAS All quotas and non-tariff measures to be eliminated upon 
accession for US priority products such as fertiliser and optic 
fibre cable (within five years for the remainder). 
Soruce: Office of the United States Trade Representative. 
What WTO entry means for the PRC reform process 
In light of the weakening 1998 domestic economy, China appeared to drag its 
effort forjoining the WTO. China's interest for WTO entry has currently renewed 
and this could be driven by 
1. Chinese government's desire to foster the Sino-US ties (as well as other 
overseas countries), and 
2. Chinese government's desire to boost foreign direct investment inflows. 
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What really catches foreign investors' eyes is the perceived committed from 
Chinese government to pursuing far-reaching structural reforms of the economy. 
Indeed, the government appears to view WTO entry as a means by which these 
reforms can be pushed through. 
During recent (April 1998) negotiations, China unexpectedly offered major 
concessions to the US concurrent with Premier Zhu's US visit, pledging to reduce 
tariffbarriers and gradually open previously protected areas of the economy, such as 
insurance and banking, to foreign participation. 
The market-opening steps that the Chinese government offered will involve 
some pain. Many of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) do not have the 
efficiency that would allow them to compete with foreign multi-nationals. The entry 
of foreign companies could therefore aggravate the existing financial problems for 
China's SOE sector. In 1998, SOE losses amounted to Rmb 155.6 billion QJSS 18.8 
billion) i.e. a 22.1% increase y-o-y. 
The WTO entry could be devastating for the state-owned domestic banking 
sector. Due to massive government-directed lending to SOEs in the red, the Chinese 
banking system is technically insolvent. Chinese banks are burdened with mounting 
bad and doubtful debt (some banking analysts claim Chines non-performing loans 
already amounted to a quarter of total loans). The domestic banking system is being 
sustained and has only been kept viable by China's high savings rate. This high 
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saving rate could be due to the lack of alternative savings vehicles offered by local 
financial institutions. WTO entry could therefore pose a lethal threat to the domestic 
banking system. Innovative and customer-oriented competitive foreign banks could 
quickly reap a handful of the domestic savings currently deposited in state banks. 
The fact that the government is willing to put up with changes that would have 
such negative consequences suggests that the China government remains committed 
to the economic reforms. These reforms were aimed at restructuring the SOEs and 
tackling the domestic banking sector problems. As the economy slowed last year, the 
government's commitment to push through these reforms seemed to weaken. For 
example, the government (in 1998) called on banks to increase lending to 
government-inspired infrastructure projects, interfering with efforts to improve asset 
quality of domestic banks. These WTO concessions indicated that these reforms have 
not been deserted. On the contrary,，it seems that the Chinese government is using 
WTO entry as a platform for this structural reforms. 
The recent WTO negotiations, up to now (April 1999), clearly illustrate that 
the Chinese government remains totally committed to commission structural 
economic reforms of the country. Although these reforms are likely to be painful in 
the short- term, increasing unemployment and depressing GDP, they are essential if 
for the long-term well-being of the Chinese economy. 
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To invest in China or not?! 
The author believe investment in China is a choice between (a) financial risk 
ofinvesting in China, and (b) strategic risk of not investing, or delayed investment, in 
China. 
Obviously, the heydays of China Fever are behind us. What really counts is 
how to structure a well-positioned and balanced China expansion plan to capture the 
growth potentials in an effective manner. 
To many foreign investors, this is also a matter ofbalancing their portfolio 
risks of investing in low-risk saturated market (say US and Europe) and higher-risk 
growth market in China. It is, essentially, a matter of risk propensity for investors. 
Business in the 21'^  century global marketplace is nothing about risk-aversion, 
but risk management! 
vc 
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Appendix I: Pioneering Chinese Issuers of International Equity 
Country ofIssue Offer Date Amount Raised 
GJS$ million) 
United States 
Brilliance China Automotive 10/9/1992 80.00 
EkChor China Motorcycle Co 6/28/1993 85.00 
ChinaTire 7/15/1993 103.70 
Shanghai Petrochemical 7/23/1993 171.00 
Huaneng Power International (ADR) 10/1994 625.00 
Hong Kong 
Denway Investment (back-door listing) 2/22/1993 51.62 
Tsingtao Brewery 7/12/1993 21.70 
Shanghai Petrochemical 7/26/1993 43.75 
Beiren Printing 8/2/1993 24.21 
Guangzhou Shipyard 8/2/1993 41.10 
Maanshan Iron and Steel 11/1/1993 41.80 
Kunming Machine 11/23/1993 16.50 
Source: Bloomberg and PricewaterhouseCoopers Analysis 
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Chapter 4 
Venture Capital Basics 
Venture capital is a specialised investment banking product originally 
pioneered in the States. Organised venture capital investment can be dated back to 
1946 with formation of the American Research and Development Corporate by 
Professor Georges Doriot ofHarvard Business School. In the world's more 
developed economies, venture capital financing is an important source of funds for 
start-up firms, private middle-market firms, and even public firms seeking buy-out 
financing. 
The venture capital industry's development exemplified how corporate 
innovation, entrepreneur's vision can be merged with professional skills of financial 
management elite to bring tremendous success. “Digital Computer" is among the 
often-quoted success story of partnership between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists. 
This chapter seeks to explore how venture capitalists are getting theirjob done 
in nurturing growth companies and how their Asian clone evolves and develops amid 
the Asian business environment. 
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We're here for today, 
we're here for tomorrow and the days to come!^ ^ 
16 Mrs. Ilene R. Moses, Managing Director of Cherry Pickers Ltd. which runs a 
USD500 million PRC direct investment funds targeted to the textile industry and 
infrastructure. 
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Industry Growth in the States 
Every emerging and growing business may need venture capital. Venture 
capitalists risk money and provide expansion / seed capital that permits a small 
company to grow and prosper. When a visionary entrepreneur invented a new idea or 
wants to operate his own business, he may seek conventional financing, say loan 
facility, from a financial institution. To his dismay, he will realise very soon that 
banks only make loans when the risk of capital loss (credit risk) is very low. 
Venture capital investments are characterised by high-risk and this risk cannot 
be mitigated by deals structuring. 
There is a fundamental difference between venture capital and a high-interest 
loan financing. This is the management assistance extended to the enterprise by the 
venture capitalist who positioned himself as a trusted business partner and advisor. 
Before proceeding to dissect the industry drivers for Asian venture capital, it 
may worth taking a while to recap the emergence and other historical milestones for 
the industry. 
This can be done by tracking down the history of venture capital industry in 
the US — the world's most matured venture capital market. 
p—^—^—— _^^ - I ^== ^^ =^ 
1946- 1969 
0 It was not until late 1950s & early 1960s that the venture capital 
industry became institutionalised. Formation of American Research 
and Development Corporate in 1946 at Boston ofMassachusetts is 
conunonly regarded as the inauguration for the industry. 
0 Industry growth was fuelled by Small Business Investment Act 1958 
when Small Business Investment Corporation were formed (and 
supplemented by government funding in the form of Small Business 
Administration loans) and enjoying numerous tax incentives. 
0 Venture capital houses qualify with the U. S. Small Business 
Administration ("SBA") requirements are able to borrow money 
60 
from SBA at lower rates as long they invest their funds in small 
businesses. (Currently, there are more than 400 venture capital 
houses qualified to seek financing from SBA.) 
1970s 
0 Emergence of limited partnership to get around the Investment 
CompanyAct of1940 which prohibits investment managers to 
received performance-based compensation. 
0 Traditional financial institution started tapping the industry by 
forming their venture capital arms. Numerous independent 
professional venture capital houses also emerged. 
0 The first industry association, the National Venture Capital 
Association, was formed in 1973. 
1980s and 1990s 
0 Consistently reported high retums attracted massive institutional 
investors (say, pension funds) participation. 
To a large extent, this actually illustrated how institutional factors can propel 
business and industry growth. 
The three most important US institutional forces working to propel the growth 
of venture capital industry are (1) regulatory changes, (2) participation of institutional 
investors and (3) maturity and growth of industry expertise. 
The First Wave 
The first wave of growth (1946-1969) is triggered by conductive government 
policies and regulations including the Small Business Investment Act ofl958 and the 
gradual tax reform which reduced significantly the tax charge on capital gains. All 
these legislation are encouraging the then teething venture capital industry which 
concentrated at providing start-up capital for small emerging businesses. 
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The Subsequent Waves 
The subsequent waves of growth (1970s and onwards) are evidenced by 
extensive employment of professional investment managers by institutional investors 
to managed their investment funds. A typical US pension fund allocated 
approximately 2 - 5 % of their money in high-risk high-retum ventures. The 
aggregate investments make by pension funds to the US venture capital pool already 
rendered them the single largest source of fund for the US venture capital pool. 
In line with the institutional participation that increased the venture capital 
pool, this also nurtured the development of seasoned venture capitalists. 
Private Equity Investment Retums and Increasing Popularity 
Morgan Stanley Research conducted a research in 1996 and the research 
findings indicated that venture capital investments (or more commonly being referred 
to be “private equity,, or “direct investment”. Hereafter, "venture capital", "private 
equity" and “direct investment” will be used interchangeably) consistently gives 
above-average return to investors. 
Private Equity (Venture Capital) Investments Enables Investors 
to Achieve Long-Term Above-Average Retums 
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The increasing recognition of the professionalism exhibited by venture 
capitalists and their marvellous achievements draw further investments from other 
investors (say endowment trusts and other private investors). 
The following table illustrates the splendid investment retums achieved by 
professional venture capitalists. This proven track record further growth propellant 
for the industry. 
IAnnualised IRR% by 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1 _ 
Year of inception 
Maximum % 243.9 54.7 64.5 61.3 70.3 33.8 57.6 30.0 68.0 
Upper Quartile % 77.6 35.9 16.7 16.8 16.6 19.9 20.9 25.2 25.9 
Medium % 29.9 15.4 9.7 11.5 12.5 10.1 15.1 19.9 16.8 
Lower Quartile % 12.4 9.4 7.1 5.9 7.7 -0.1 5.6 10.5 9.7 
Minimum % 2.1 1.8 3.0 -33.7 -10.6 -43.9 -6.5 6.0 -24.7 
Source: Venture Economics 1997 
# Statistics represent annualised retums. Most funds formed in 1992 will have completed 
their investment period. Funds formed after 1992 will still be in the process of investing 
their portfolio, and as a result, analysis of their unrealised investment portfolio may not 
be meaningful. 
The set of similar institutional factors also orchestrated to fuel the venture 
capital industry's growth in Asia Pacific. 
Let us take a closer look at the make-up of the more matured US and European 
markets before we re-cap the milestones for Asian venture capital industry. Let us 
start with the relative market sizing for venture capital industry in the three markets: 
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Private Equity Investments have Reached Record Highs in the U.S., 
Europe and Asia 
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Obviously, the US markets takes up the largest chunk of the pie and attracts 
investments from all over the world. Thus, US has been ranked the largest recipient 
of foreign direct investment during the last decade. Despite Asia (including Japan) 
market is catching up rapidly, it is still, by far, a distant second behind the US market. 
The source of venture capital funds 
Corporations, insurance companies and banks have provided the majority of 
venture capital funds in Asia. However, the funding sources differ quite significantly 
across countries within this region. The venture capital funds in Hong Kong for 
example, are more developed and have tapped intemational insurance companies for 
funding. In Taiwan and Singapore however, local corporations have been the largest 
investors in venture capital funds. Meanwhile, banks have been the leaders in 
investing in direct investment funds in Asia. 
Up to 1998, the vast majority of funds for venture capital investing in Asia 
came fi:om regional and domestic sources. The latest industry statistics in 1996 
revealed 74.1% of funds came from Asian sources. The following groups were the 
most active in funding Asian venture capital up to 1998. 
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1. Insurance Companies. American insurance companies have been the 
leading investors in Asian venture capital funds in recent years, especially 
in funds based out ofHong Kong. The most active insurance companies 
include AIG/AIA and Prudential (which also manage their own funds) 
and John Hancock, Allstate and The Equitable (which tend to be limited 
partners in various funds in the region). 
2. US Commercial Banks. The American commercial banks have also 
greatly increased funding for direct investments in the region. Citicorp, 
Chemical (later reorganised into the Chase Capital Partners) and Bank of 
America have established their own funds and management in the region. 
The US investment banks also followed their commercial banking 
counterparts. 
3. Corporate & Public Pension Funds. Several private and public sector 
pension funds have increased their participation in Asian direct 
investments. (This includes Schinedler Group, GE Capital & The 
California Public Employees' Retirement System.) 
4. University endowment funds. Fuelled by the rising intention of US 
schools to go international, their making of direct investment in Asia is 
not unpredictable. The more active endowment funds include that from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. 
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Source: National Venture Capital Association, 
European Venture Capital Association, 
Asian Venture Capital Joumal 1997 
We could see from the chart that source of funding differs significantly for the 
venture capital industry in the three markets. In the US, well-developed pension 
funds is the most important provider of venture capital financing while in the Asian 
market, it is the individual corporations that provides the largest mass of the cake. 
/ 
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The Asian Migration 
The venture capital """"industry in Asia has grown rapidly in the past few 
decades. According to the Asian Venture Capital Journal, the Asian venture capital 
pool grew from US$21.9 billion in 1991口 to approximately US$36.1 billion in 1997. 
The industry growth, as measured by number of professional venture capital 
management firms, was also breathtaking. The industry demonstrated a rapid growth 
from 334 firms in 1991 to 827 firms in 1997. 
Table 1: Asian Venture Capital Pool 1991-97 (Funds Under Management) 
OJS$ million) ] 9 n ] ^ J ^ 1 ^ J ^ j ^ 1997 
Hong Kong / l J f l 2 ^ 3 ^ 6 ^ 8 ^ 8 ^ 1 0 ^ 
China 
Indonesia 76 57 99 225 245 289 426 
Japan 15,352 16,028 17,750 17,750* 14,851 11,254 7,722 
Korea 1,547 1,629 1,687 1,902 2,567 3,224 1,857 
Malaysia 75 147 160 194 437 448 406 
Singapore 868 896 1,013 1,833 3,164 3,981 4,468 
Taiwan 412 470 508 562 696 1,336 1,913 
Thailand 64 90 98 117 165 201 177 
Other countries 
not listed 
Total 21,925 23,431 26,222 30,951 33,433 33,791 32.136 
#VCflmds 334 354 399 659 752 839 827 
Source: Asian Venture Capital Journal, 1998 
* 1993figures (1994figures not available) 
Despite such rapid growth, little has been written about the development of 
venture capital funds in the region, their investments and transactions, or strives to 
portrait how the industry will develop in the future. 
17 All statistical data quoted in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, is 
extracted from Asian Venture Capital Journal 1998 
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Many industry observers, however, have commented that investment funds 
have increased too rapidly, and that attractive rates of return will not be sustainable. 
This section of the report will briefly highlight, 
1 • the development history of direct investments in the region; 
2. how Asia venture capitalists leamed from their US and European counterparts; 
3. the historical milestones for the direct investment firms tapping into China; and 
4. how venture capital could gain higher investor / investee profile in China. 
In addition, this paper will only analyse the activities of the organised venture 
capital funds in Asia. Organised venture capital firms are defined as corporations or 
partnerships whose main activity consists of raising funds and investing in private 
equity situations. Venture capital activities by individuals (despite being an organised 
personal wealth investment risk diversification) are beyond the scope of this report 
(i.e. include corporate venturing but exclude other forms of long-term and strategic 
direct investments). 
The Emergence of Asian Pioneers 
The venture capital industry in Greater China, Southeast Asia saw its formal 
inception in 1981, when Arral & Partners (Asia) Ltd. was formed by two former 
bankers fLouis Bowen and Anil Thadani) in Hong Kong. Arral started with a US$ 75 
million fund targeted at investments throughout the region. Despite the partnership 
was terminated in 1992, it cast a remarkable milestone in the development of Asia 
Pacific private equity industry. 
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The industry however, remained quite inactive until 1985, when institutional 
investors began to raise funds and establish offices in the region. Three companies 
that played important roles in the development of the industry at the time were 
ChinaVest, and Hambrecht & Quist，and Prudential. 
(1) ChinaVest 
ChinaVest was established in 1985 in Hong Kong by Robert Thaleen, a 
military veteran who remained in the region after the Vietnam War. ChinaVest was 
among the first to raise US institutional funds and invest in companies in China. 
Thaleen invested mostly in Hong Kong businesses expanding in Guangdong province. 
The returns from these early investments were reported to be in the range oi30-40% 
p.a. 
(2) Hambrecht & Quist 
In 1986，Hambrecht & Quist (H&Q)，one of the leading investment banks for 
the technology sector in the United States, established operations in Taiwan and 
Singapore. Ta-Lin Hsu, a principal at H&Q, first invested in technology companies 
started by Taiwanese returnees from Silicon Valley. H&Q eventually established 
several small funds, each between US$5 and US$20 million, to invest in the "dragon" 
economies ofTaiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Most ofH&Q，s initial investments 
remained in the electronics and technology sectors, but the firm later expanded its 
range of investments to include consumer-related and industrial companies. 
(3) Prudential Asset Management 
In the same year, Prudential Insurance Company committed US$ 500 million 
for direct investment in the region and formed Prudential Asset Management Asia 
(PAMA) to oversee the company's Asian private equity investment activities. This 
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was a major event in the Asian venture capital industry because up to that time, only 
limited funds had been committed to the region. Prudential's use of its own funds, 
rather than the funds of other institutions, allowed the immediate injection of a large 
pool of capital into direct investments in the region. PAMA is headed by a Hong 
Kong local business leader, Mr. Victor Fung, who pioneered full-scale direct 
investment business with initial focus on non-technology companies in Southeast 
Asia. This also marked the prelude ofhigh-profile involvement ofHong Kong 
business community' in organised venture capital investments. 
These three firms probably had the greatest impact on the venture capital 
industry in Asia for several reasons. 
1. the arrival of these firms helped increase awareness among local and 
overseas institutional investors about direct investment in the region; 
2. these fund managers were able to demonstrate that proven Westem 
professional venture capital methods could operate successfully in 
Asia's less developed financial, legal and accounting business 
environments; 
3. these firms also increased the number of investment professionals in the 
region. Alumni from these initial funds would later bring their expertise 
to new institutions, or would later establish their own funds; and 
4. by having these pioneer venture capitalists instituting a workable 
framework for Asian venture capital industry, the industry was able to 
attract and retain professional managers with a diversity ofexperience 
and background to propel the further development of the industry. 
70 
The Asian venture capital pool grew at a compound annual growth rate of over 
20% during its teething stage (from 1988 to 1991). The pool's growth during the 
initial years can be attributed to the following reason: 
1. the high retums from the early entrants such as Arral, ChinaVest, H&Q, 
and Prudential stimulated the formation of more funds. The respective 
company brochures reported these early funds achieved retums in excess 
of 20% per year; 
2. the recession of the late eighties and early nineties in North America and 
Europe weakened the retums for venture capital in these regions: many 
international direct investment firms began to target Asia (as part of their 
globalisation and diversification program); 
3. investors started to identify and spot opportunities from "market 
opening" and deregulation of many Asian economies, particularly those 
in China and Southeast Asia. 
The Asian venture capital pool has witnessed its greatest growth in the past 
decade, as we saw new funds increased by an sustainable annual compound growth 
rate of 6.8% during 1991 to 1997. This proliferation phase of the private equity pool 
can be attributed to the following reason which actualised (or emerged) during this 
period: 
1. Large valuation differentials between private and public securities. 
During early 1990s, the stock exchanges in Greater China, and the 
Southeast Asian countries skyrocketed to new pinnacles. As 
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illustrations, the market capitalisation of the stock exchanges ofHong 
Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia all increased by over 100% during this 
period. Price-earnings ratios of Southeast Asian equities also exhibited a 
significant increase. Meanwhile, private equity entry multiples 
remained in the single digit range (typically 3x to 5x). Venture 
capitalists realised that large profits could be achieved by investing in 
expansion stage companies and taking them public on the Asian 
domestic stock exchanges. 
2. Escalating familiarity with Asian equity markets. 
The (Asian domestic and US) insurance and pension funds started 
invested heavily in Asian equity markets in early 1990s to capture the 
market capitalisation growth. After gaining familiarity with the Asian 
public equity markets, the pension funds (and other institutional funds in 
US and Europe) started to seek higher returns from unlisted investments 
in the region. 
3. Asian Infrastructure investments on the spotlight. 
Asian infrastructure (including public utilities companies) became an 
extremely popular theme with US institutional investors recently 
(during mid-1990s). The infrastructure-related investment offerings in 
the Asian public equity markets in Asia however, were quite limited at 
that time. Several large financial institutions, including AIG/AIA, the 
Soros Foundation, and GE Capital have siphoned billions of dollars in 
recent years to new private equity funds for infrastructure in Asia. 
These professional investors want to participate in the growth offered by 
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progressive de-regularisation (in particular permitting foreign direct 
investments) of Asian infrastructure and public utilities industries. They 
eye the high growth potential offered in the Asian emerging market, as 
compared to the relative stagnant growth in their home country's 
saturated market. 
The author will wrap-up this section by a snapshot of actual project 
disbursement of the Asian venture capital pool. 
1997 Asian venture capital pool actual disbursements to industry 
Industry Amount Percent of Number of 
Invested Total (%) Companies 
OJS$ mil) 
Consumer related 3,373 16.9 3,233 
Computer related 1,677 8.4 1,764 
Electronics related 1,836 9.2 1,940 
Industrial products 3,094 15.5 2,775 
Medical / Biotechnology 659 3.3 557 
Communications 1,537 7.7 751 
Energy 759 3.8 543 
Transportation 858 4.3 364 
Construction 1,777 8.9 1,287 
Financial Services 858 4.3 832 
Other Services 1,477 7.4 1,741 
Other Manufacturing 2,056 10.3 2,033 
Total 19,961 “ 100.0 17,820 
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The China Fund Crusaders 
H H Period : Driving Forces (Approximately Size o f P o ^ 
1986 - 91 : Small private investment groups & small PRC Ministry-
backed funds 0^S$240 million) 
1992 : Corporate investors mainly represented by regional 
(Asian) investment groups & industrial groups 0^S$925 
million) 
1993 : Large American investors & extensive PRC Ministries' 
support 0L S^$3 billion) 
In line with the China Fever in 1993 and 1994, China direct investment funds 
also demonstrated vigorous adaptations and robust expansion in the early 1990s. 
Industry consensus categorised the early developments of China direct investment 
funds into three waves. Each wave is characterised by emergence of a specific pattem 
in either deal sourcing, form and structure of investment projects, or affiliations of 
investment funds. 
The author believes professionalism and institutionalisation of the investment 
process is the key to the 1990s splendid germination of Asian direct investment funds. 
By having a more organised and co-ordinated effort, this group of China direct 
investment funds is able to pave the road for other investors investing into China. The 
latecomers could now conduct their business in a more transparent and healthy set of 
institutional factors. 
74 
First Wave(1986- 1991) 
The “First Wave" of China direct investment funds was characterised by small 
private investment groups (most of which were based in Hong Kong) & some small-
size PRC Ministry-backed investment funds. 
The formal inception for the era of China direct investment funds rooted in 
1986 when Hong Kong-based independent investment house ChinaVest successfully 
raised the first US$12 million China direct investment fund. Established in 1980 by 
Robert Theleen, this company has grown from an investment consultancy firm into 
one ofHong Kong's largest independent private equity fund management group. 
(ChinaVest's show-case investments include the Domino's Pizza and TGI Friday 
franchises. It's brilliant track-record is, however, dimmed by its 1995 controlling-
stake investment in KPS Retail Stores, a down-trodden home entertainment products 
retail chain which was caught under spotlight and attracted extensive media attention.) 
Hong Kong solicitor Victor Chu who co-headed ChinaVest during 1987 and 
1991 mimicked this groundbreaking launching. Victor raised his own US$20 million 
Kwong Wah Investment Fund. His firm, First Eastem Group, up to now is still the 
largest Hong Kong-based independent private equity investment house. 
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In less than 1 year, we also saw China Venturetech Investment Corporation 
(with the then State Science and Technology Commission as its major shareholder) 
raised its own US$37 million direct investment fund. This is another groundbreaking 
milestone as this company is the first Chinese home-grown professional private equity 
investment house. Although China Venturetech closed down its business in 1998，it 
nourished the first batch of locally brought-up talents for the industry. 
During these early days, this group of investment professionals is 
characterised by a relative small fund size. The author believes this is due to absence 
of an availing investment climate and lack of institutional investor's participation. 
The then professional venture capitalists are characterised by their mainland Chinese 
business affiliations. 
Second Wave (mid-1992) 
The Second Wave is characterised by the front-end involvement of corporate 
investors which include by regional (Asian) investment groups & other Asian 
conglomerates seeking overseas expansion opportunities into China. 
Leverage on their proven Asian experience, this group of newcomers brought 
with them 
1. enhanced financial resources to flourish a larger venture capital pool to 
support future investment projects, 
76 
2. economies of scale and synergy with their respective portfolio companies 
in sourcing China investment opportunities, 
3. professional management expertise and manufacturing know-how, and 
4. established relationship with overseas institutional investors which 
broadened the investor base, 
All these built up the backbone for proliferation of mega (> US$100 million) 
China direct investment funds in the forthcoming Third Wave era. 
The author believes this wave of investment boom is due to a more transparent 
government policy by the Chinese government. Booming of this wave was ignited 
by the 1992 visit of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to Southern China which 
demonstrated the central government's support to uphold its “Open Door” Policy". 
This cleared institutional investors' doubts and foreign investors' concem on China's 
determination to sustain its economic reform. 
Third Wave (1993) 
International investors always value predictable and consistent government 
policies. The 1992 Southern China visit by Deng Xiaoping served to demonstrate 
Chinese policy-makers' commitment to economic reform and encourage foreign direct 
investment. 
During this stage, we could see exponential growth in funds earmarked for 
China direct investments. The following chart illustrates the fund size for Asian and 
China venture capital pools which clearly indicated the exponential growth of China 
direct investment funds since 1992. 
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Asian & China Venture Capital Pool 
(capital under management) 
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(Source: Asian Venture Capital Journal) 
The early successful story of China direct investment funds and 
institutionalisation of the industry attracted participation from deep-pocketed 
American institutional investors. They participate either by launching their own (or 
co-invest) in China direct investment funds or through allocating a PRC portion from 
their regional / global investment fund pool. 
Hand-in-hand with American institutional investors' participation, we also 
identified additional involvement from State Council Ministries and other Chinese 
government agencies. We saw more and more cross-border alliances andjoint 
ventures formed during this period. Depending upon the background and strength of 
the Chinese affiliates. 
Industry or geographic-specific funds also emerged due to broadened co-
investor base which now includes high-profile State Council Ministries and 
government agencies. Typical examples that comes to my mind include the industry-
specific Tien Lee China Aeronautical Technology Fund's fund and geographic-
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specific funds such as SHK Pearl River Delta Investment Fund and AIG / Guangzhou 
Investment Fund. 
Fund management firms 
Apart from Asian operations of the established US / European venture capital 
houses, the Asian venture capital fund managers can be categorised into the following 
5 groups: 
1. Local independent venture capital firms. 
The independent direct investment firms include partnerships such as 
Arral Partners and ChinaVest mentioned above. 
2. Affiliates of international insurance companies. 
This category of venture capital funds is backed by the insurance 
companies and includes Prudential Asset Management Asia (PAMA) and 
American International Group/ American International Assurance 
(AIG/AIA). These funds tend to be large (typically over US$ 250 
million) with much of the funding coming from the parent insurance 
company. 
3. Investment Banks from Hong Kong/UK & America. 
This group of direct investment firms comprises almost all of the 
merchant banks in Hong Kong, including local and British merchant 
banks. Starting in the late 1980s, these institutions entered into the direct 
investment battlefield. 
Some of the more active merchant banks in this industry include 
Schroders, Hong Kong Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Peregrine (no 
longer in the Asian venture capital scene), Kleinwort Benson (now 
Dredsner Kleinwort Benson), CEF (the merchant bank ofTycoon Li Ka 
Shing's Cheung Kong group), and Jardine Fleming. Most of these firms 
are based in Hong Kong and are focused primarily on greater China. 
(This group also includes Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Donaldson 
79 
Lufkin Jenrette, JP Morgan and Bankers Trust. Most of the investment 
banks invest in Asia by allocating an Asian portion from their global 
direct investment funds.) 
4. Commercial Banks. 
The commercial banks are expected to become increasingly active in 
direct investments in the region by tapping their Asian business into the 
direct investment sector. The are leveraging on their established business 
network and client contacts. The Bank ofEast Asia is among this group of 
newcomers. 
5. Corporate Venturing Clone (including corporate insurance fund 
managers) and their outgrowths. 
Most of their companies are taking a very low market profile. The more 
prominent and high-profile ones include GE Capital and Lee & Fung 
Direct Investment. 
What Entrepreneurs don't Know about Venture Capital 
From myjob-related contact with entrepreneurs, the author prepared the 
following list of questions that are commonly raised by entrepreneurs who come to 
venture capitalists for the first time. 
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1. How could entrepreneurs maintain proprietary manufacturing techniques or 
business processes confidential in light of new equity investors? 
2. How will private investors participate in a deal? 
3. What is the common disclosure and on-going obligations required from 
entrepreneurs? 
4. What is the comfortable investment amount for private investors. 
5. What are the project selection criteria used in evaluating a deal? 
6. What is the return and time frame required from the private investors. 
7. What is the typical structure of private deals 
8. Where can the entrepreneurs meet and be introduced to the right private 
investors? 
9. What are the typical investors in private deals. 
10. What will the private investors bring to the company besides their investment 
money? 
The section that follows will answer questions 1 to 7 listed above. (The 
chapter that follows will provide an answer to questions 8，9 and 10.) One thing that 
is for sure is that venture capitalist not only provides expansion capital to emerging 
business. They will distinguish themselves from commercial bankers by providing 
value-added financial and strategic advice to their investee companies. 
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Common Deals Structure and Patterns ofInvestments 
| H E ^ i t y biterest : Minority equity interest of20 - 30%. 
Entry Price : Normally at only 3 - 4 times of current year profit. 
Dividend : Annual cash dividend or other covenants on dividend distribution. 
Put Option : Option to sell-back shares to the majority owners under certain 
conditions, say 
a. profits significantly below forecast 
b. fail to go public 
c. end of a definite period (normally 3 - 5 years) 
Operational : Team up with established operating partner within the industry. 
Surveillance Owner-manager will take care of the daily operations and all the 
shareholders shall sign a confidentially agreement among 
themselves. 
Business Scope : Viable products (either revolutionary, innovative, evolutionary or 
substitutions) with secured distribution and procurement network. 
Board Representation : Right to appoint director to represent investor in the Board of 
investee company. 
Management Reporting : Management accounts on monthly (or at least quarterly) basis. 
Annual Audit & : Audited statutory accounts (normally by Big 5 international 
Examination accounting firms) with right to employ independent auditors to 
review and examine investee books & records. 
Looking into the Future 
The author saw a very unhealthy trend in Asian (especially China) venture 
capital industry. The industry players tends to adopt a generic approach i.e. focus on 
pre-IPO investment without much involvement in business operations management. 
Asian venture capital funds managers are mostly purely financial investors and have 
yet to exercise their value-adding roles in their portfolio investee companies. This 
reliance in generic type investments may limits our industrial developments as this 
brings: 
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0 limitations on deal sourcing & creates reliance on intermediaries. Industry 
players have to ensure goal-alignment with our intermediaries and may need to 
develop alternatives such as industry specialisation etc. 
0 limitations on negotiation power with reference to valuation and pricing terms. 
The inherently low price flexibility of pre-IPO offer (with IPO price as 
benchmark) renders elaborate valuation models and complicated pricing structure 
excessive. Structuring of exit protection such as put options will become 
increasing difficult in this competitive market 
While the amount of private equity funds committed to the region may 
increase at an uncertain pace, several factors indicate that venture capital returns in 
Asia will remain superior to those in the US The reasons for a potentially-higher 
return are: 
1. Buying into low (of a historically-high economic growth region). 
Economic growth rates are historically considerably higher in the Asia 
region (in the per-Asian Financial Crisis years), and re-bound is predicted 
to crystallise within the next 3 - 7 years. Buying into lows and wait for 
the next economic upswing may offer significantly higher return than 
investing in other matured markets. 
2. Broad based investments. 
Venture capital funds in Asia are invested quite evenly across a number of 
industries including consumer products, technology, manufacturing and 
infi:astructure. This diverse portfolio should be subject to less risk than 
the venture capital pool in the US, which focuses more on the technology 
and biotechnology sectors. 
3. Low venture capital penetration. 
Penetration rates for venture capital in Asia are still low compared to the 
United States. Penetration rates are derived by dividing total venture 
capital funds by Gross National Product for each country. Based on this 
analysis, Asia has only US$3.54 of venture capital funds for every 
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US$1,000 ofGNP, while the rate for the US is US$5.79. The analysis 
indicates that the Asian venture capital industry is not saturated yet. 
4. Inadequate sector representation in Asian public equity markets. 
The public equity markets in Asia, particularly Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Thailand, are dominated by property and financial sector companies. 
The composition of these equity markets does not reflect the components 
of their respective economies. Thus, investors can better access under-
represented sectors through private equity investments. 
All these aforementioned factors apply particularly well in China especially 
for its under-developed securities market. Obviously, we have to admit that, to a 
certain extent, international investors' interests in China have gone lukewarm. Up to 
the end of mid-1990s，China was the primary target market for most direct investment 
firms in the region. About sixty percent of all the funds in the region in mid-1990s 
were managed by firms based in Hong Kong: this not only reflected the tax and legal 
advantages ofHong Kong, but also the interest of most of the funds to be located on 
the doorstep of China. 
In recent years (starting from 1997) however, overseas investor interest in 
China has waned due to 
1. persistent inflation, which may cause instability in the non-coastal regions 
due to the intensifying income parity; 
2. lack of well-founded legal and enforcement systems; 
3. inadequate financial information and standards for protection of investors; 
4. bureaucracy at local, provincial and municipal levels of government. This 
is further complicated by the role of government regulatory ministries 
having their own conflicting business interests; 
5. lack of consistent and predictable government industrial policy; and 
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6. negative media coverage of disputes between foreign companies and 
Chinese enterprises. 
Despite these problems with China, many investment professionals still feel 
that it offers the most promising private equity opportunities in Asia ifcertain 
successful strategies are replicated and followed. (Please see Chapter 7 for "Critical 
Success Factors for Venturing Capital Houses operating in China") 
Overview ofVenture Capital in China 
Sources ofVenture Capital Funding 
Out of the total capital ofUS$3,612 million, corporations accounted for 56% . 
Insurance companies and pension funds followed with contributions representing 
11.2% and 9.2% of the total respectively. A breakdown of this total amount by source 
and by countries is set out as follows: 
By Source: Percentage By Countries: Percentage 
Corporations 56.0% China 36.7% 
Insurance Companies 11.2% Hong Kong 12.8% 
Banks 9.7% Non-Asian Countries 38.7% 
Pension Funds 9.2% Other Asian Countries 11.8% 
Private Individuals 7.0% Total 100.0% 一 
Govemment Agencies 2.9% 
Others 4.0% 
Total 100.0% “ 
(Source: Asian Venture Capital Journal) 
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Disbursement ofFunds 
Out ofthe total capital ofUS$3,612 million, an estimated US$2,812 million 
have been invested in the following industries as of end ofl997: 
Industry Amount Percent of Number of 
Invested Total Companies 
ODS$ mil) 
Consumer related 355 12.6 52 
Computer related 52 1.8 8 
Electronics related 123 4.4 26 
Industrial products 375 13.3 59 
Medical / Biotechnology 31 1.1 7 
Communications 34 1.2 7 
Energy 277 9.9 37 
Transportation 322 11.5 34 
Construction 689 24.5 41 
Financial Services 21 0.7 5 
Other Services 75 2.7 21 
Other Manufacturing 458 16.3 30 
Total 2,812 “ 100.0 329 
(Source: Asian Venture Capital Joumal) 
Problems facing VC firms 
Despite the Asian opportunities which opens the door for venture capitalists, 
the fact remains that direct investment in the region is full of challenges, especially for 
those firms that are used to operating in the United States and trying to replicate their 
US success stories in China. Some of the difficulties faced by venture capital firms in 
the region include: 
1. Lack of legal structures. 
Many of the countries in the region lack the legal systems for limited 
partnerships and full-fledge minority shareholders protection. This 
obviously makes local ftmd formation more difficult. 
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2. Lack of secondary equity markets. 
Some countries in the region, most notably Hong Kong, lack secondary 
markets for smaller company listings. The minimum capitalisation for a 
listing on the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong (SEHK) is HK$ 50 million, 
but most investment banks will not underwrite issues less than HK$ 100 
million. In addition, all firms listed in the SEHK must have at least three 
consecutive years of profitability prior to listing. Venture capitalists and 
The Hong Kong Association ofBanks has recommended that a second 
board should be established to increase the chances for exit via initial 
public offerings. (As of April 1999，the SEHK already proposed a 
Growth Enterprise Market to answer the call from the investor 
community. Consultation Paper has been issued to collect comments and 
opinions from the general public as well as the investment profession.) 
3. Deal flow. 
China has yet to establish its own network of deal flow and open forum 
system which create direct contact between potential direct investment 
investor and investees. The author has yet to see any formal organisation 
of an industry association in China targeting at building a national-wide 
investor / investee forum which is necessary to further propel the growth 
of venture capital industry in China. 
4. Lack of investment professionals. 
Most of the funds are based in either Hong Kong or Singapore, where 
management talent is increasingly scarce. Professionals with corporate 
finance backgrounds are in especially high demand as international 
merchant and investment banks move into the region. It is both difficult 
to train and retain seasoned venture capital investment professionals. 
Conclusion 
From rather modest beginnings in 1981，the Asian venture capital industry has 
evolved into one with a large capital pool, international investors base, and an 
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enviable investment record. The industry today is composed of local venture capital 
firms, local and international investment banks, commercial banks, global insurance 
companies, and major US venture capital firms. These funds are being invested in a 
broad array of expansion stage companies in the consumer, manufacturing, and 
infrastructure sectors. 
Many investors however, question whether the rates of return for venture 
capital firms in Asia can be sustained. Industry observers have compared the recent 
flood of funds into the region with the fatal expansion of venture capital ftmds in the 
US from 1981 to 1983. However, high economic growth rates in the emerging 
market, a diversified range of investments, and other factors indicate that the rate of 
return for direct investment firais in the region are sustainable and should continue to 
exceed those found in other parts of the world. 
Institutional investors however, should exercise caution when allocating funds 
to venture capital in Greater China, Southeast Asia or the Subcontinent. Funds should 
only be directed towards venture capital firms that have a track record in the region, 
sufficient investment professionals and infrastructure, and an attractive mix of 




The Capital Gap 
Owner-operators who own and operate their own businesses as well as other 
small-scale emerging businesses have very special needs. At one day, this can be a 
thirst for manufacturing know-how and technical support, the other day can be expert 
advice on corporate re-structuring, and, almost common to all business entrepreneurs, 
the pressing demand to satisfy their cashflow and financing needs. These are typical 
problems for emerging businesses and many of our world-renowned industry leaders 
painstakingly survived through this learning curve and grew to become leaders in their 
fields. 
At the start-up business stage ofbusiness, few financial resources are available 
to owner operators and "seed money" is generally provided solely by themselves and / 
or their family members. This will limit scope of operations and size of expansion of 
these emerging businesses. We can say although the entrepreneur opportunities seem 
to be clear as outlined in the business plan, these opportunities will only be realised if 
management has the knowledge and experience to capitalise on them. In most 
circumstances, "venture capitalists" is the only external resource of financing that is 
available at the start up stage. 
Owner-Manager Entrepreneurs, having a very special needs, tend to look for 
professional relationship with a financial adviser who understands the wide range of 
services required by them and ensures they receive the right and timely advice. 
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The previous chapters analysed the "buy side" considerations of private 
equity. In this chapter, we will explore the "sell side" considerations highlighted 
above. Some suggestions are identified to align the "buy" and "sell" sides. 
We will look into the financial needs of growth companies and how partnering 
with venture capitalist can be mutually beneficial. 
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"There shall be more money chasing after good deals 
than good deals wandering around and 
waiting for expansion capital! ” 
It is a matter of learning how to access capital sources, 
and addressing critical management factors which 
investors will look at. 
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Asian Emerging Businesses Offer Venture Capital Opportunities 
Historically, Asian emerging (and usually family-owned) small to medium-
sized businesses ("SMEs") are building block of the Asia Pacific prosperity. It is 
instrumental for us to acquire a brief understanding of their evolution and growth 
pattem and how they can satisfy their financing needs at different growth stage. We 
can visualise how these emerging businesses can be nurtured before they become 
financially and commercially viable. 
To put the Asian SME importance into figures and get a taste of their 
economic importance, we could see from the following graph how their make up the 
bulk of GNP in their respective countries: 
Top 5 Local Asian Family Enterprises 
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Source: A. T. Keamey White Paper on Revolution of the Asian Entrepreneur 
The above chart fully exemplified the commercial importance of Asian SMEs 
and how they could contribute to the growth of their countries' emerging economy. 
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China Business Strategy and Outlook for Venture Capitalists - a SME perspective 
The author believes China will continue to be a favourable and attractive 
investment destination because of: 
1 • major infrastructure development programs which offers sizeable 
investment opportunities and increase China's internal efficiency and 
competitiveness, 
2. improving business environment due to establishing of more transparent 
and regularised legal and business frameworks, 
3. major privatisation efforts and more liberalised business environment by 
eliminating political influences over business decisions, 
4. high risk / reward ratio arise amid these institutional factors changes in the 
post-Crisis era, and 
5. lifting oflegal hurdles (and increasing competitive entry pricing) for 
foreign investors to acquire Chinese domestic enterprises. Alternatively, 
business start-up costs have also been driven down by codling effect after 
the 1997 / 1998 financial turmoil. 
The improved business and investment landscape will trigger local investment 
sentiment and attracts foreign investors (in their post-Crisis strive to "buy low" with a 
reasonable hope of"selling high" in the years to come). However investors should 
still be careful as 
1. increased competition for shortage of quality & viable deals is still driving 
up the cost of investment (this is not restricted to China, particularly in the 
Asian newly industrialised nations such as Taiwan and Singapore in the 
post-Crisis era) 
2. deflationary pressure in the regional, austerity program in China (and 
other South Eastem countries as well as their political and currency 
< 
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uncertainty) could lead to slower regional economic growth and sluggish 
stock market which adversely affect exit timing and valuation 
The 1997 / 1998 Asian Financial Crisis injected a more-than-adequate dose of 
catalyst for Asian counties to (a) re-think their core competency (b) re-invent 
themselves and (c) re-align and re-allocate their economic resources. All these gives 
rise to broaden political and economic reform which see Asian countries，way to 
more consolidated competitiveness in the 21st century marketplace. 
Asian countries proved themselves to be responsive to changing customer 
demand and being reflective in their business dealings. The bulk of the Asian 
“business agility” is contributed by the region's numerous SMEs which exhibited 
exponential growth in the pre-Crisis Asian heydays. The post-Crisis general liquidity 
squeeze has choked the impulse of Asian's SMEs. 
Associated with this "Asian suffocation" are numerous entry opportunities for 
the deep-pocket venture capitalists who already established themselves within this 
region. 
The author recapped below elements that moulds investment sentiments in the 
pre- and post-Crisis arena. 
94 
|@SSESSSSSS3SSBSH Pre-Cnsis Post-Crisis iMoney supply o excess liquidity pouring o indiscriminate roll-out of 
into money market and recessionary monetary 
sparked enormous asset policy may even suffocate 
value inflation enterprises with sound 
fundamentals 
Provision of credit o ill-regulated bank lending o dry out ofbank lending 
andeasycredit oevenfundamentally 
sound enterprises are 
difficult in getting 
essential working capital 
and trade financing 
Regulatory o inadequate regulatory o aroused awareness in the 
framework infrastructure / cultural regulator & institutional 
differences not level to regularise the 
adequately recognised playing field 
Investment o abundant idle money o investment money 
sentiment chasing after investment vanished and projects are 
projects and drives evaluated by extravagant 
investment return (even unhealthy) level of 
unreasonably low risk-aversion 
0 enterprises may have to 
seek non-bank alternative 
source of financing (offer 
potential for venture 
capitalists to share 
financial success in the 
next economic upswing) 
Despite the apparent immunity from the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
widespread liquidity squeeze that follows, Chinese SMEs ^>oth the foreign-invested 
and domestic ones) already encounter difficulties in financing their growth. 
These Chinese emerging companies, generally smaller in size and more 
responsive to dynamic business environments, may lost this twinkling opportunities to 
capture the lucrative niche market and opportunities that emerge from the Asian 
economic restructuring. My banking sources indicated that more and more American 
and European businessman are shifting their Asian merchandise procurement basis 
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from other debt-ridden and fragile Asian economies to China for the perceived 
political stability. The Chinese companies, however, are unable to cater for the new 
business demands for their lack of expansion capital and，sometimes unfortunately, 
working capital. The recovery of Asian business viability is largely a function ofhow 
fast these responsive SMEs could re-gain their financial strength and re-capture their 
business impetus. The necessity to seek alternative non-bank financial resources to 
fliel the region's economic growth deserves immediate attention to business 
executives all over the region. 
Rooting the Finance Gap for SMEs 
We now understand how the survival of SMEs is indispensable to the Asian 
recovery. The section that follows tries to provide an explanation for the increasing 
difficulties for Chinese emerging companies to secure the necessary financing. 
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What do Banks Look for in Making a Small Business Loan? 
The following is a list of major items a banker might look for when evaluating 
a loan application^^ 
1. Entrepreneur's level of experience. This represents the education level or 
practical experience necessary to make the business a successful one. 
2. Entrepreneur's personal credit history. This may include getting bank 
reference from the entrepreneur's banker. The bank may even ask for 
personal guarantee or pledge of assets for a first-time borrower. 
3. Quality and quantity of liquid assets of the business. This is to evaluate 
the business' ability to meet short-term financing needs. 
4. Profitability of the business. This involves submitting past and current 
statements of operations and balance sheet. On top of this, future profit 
projections and cash flow analysis may also be requested by the bank. 
In particular, commercial banks in this region generally prefer larger-sized 
businesses. In performing credit analysis, they generally scrutinise on 
1. How much the business need. 
2. How will the new financing help the business (say reduced cost，increased 
cashflow, and increased sales) 
3. How will the company pay back the loan? The banker may require year-
long / quarterly cash projections and compare this against the business / 
owner-manager's track records. 
4. The entrepreneur or majority shareholder's personal stake in the business 
(the “Jmrt money). 
18 "What do Banks Look for in Making a Small Business Loan?”. The Small 
Business Journal. Q[ntemet Version at www.tsbj.com) February 1998. 
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5. How will the company repay if things don't plan out? This is essentially 
what banks could reasonable recover from the business when it went 
wrong. Typically, bankers may require contingency plans, and more 
importantly, collateral and asset-based mortgages. 
The author sees no reason why the Chinese emerging business could not 
satisfy the bakers for requirements (1) and (2). However, their lack of established and 
verifiable track record, limited (and sometimes already exhausted) owner-manager's 
financial resources, and absence of collateral could hardly satisfy the bankers for 
requirements (3)，（4) and (5). 
The region's commercial banks are generally hesitated to extend credit to 
developing smaller-scale businesses and prefers dealing with world-renowned big-
names. In many cases the financial institution are facing an internal problem of asset 
allocation which restricts extension of credit to small and medium-sized firms. 
The author hates to reach this conclusion but has to conclude that start-up and 
emerging businesses may fail these stringent credit criteria and have to tum to family 
financing and / or other alternative financing. (Please see Appendix 1 for a list of 
suggested “Alternative Non-Bank Financing".) Among these feasible alternative 
financing methods, equity financing from venture capitalists sounds a way out! 
Venture Capital as a potential alternative financing 
Before further looking into the Capital Gap, it is worth to take a look at 




^ ^ Q ^ ^ Q Q [ Q ^ ^ 9 | H H Venture Capital Financing Debt Financing 
i m i p ^ j e c t i v e s Maximise capital retum Interest payment 
Holding period 2-5 years Short / medium term 
Instrument Common shares, convertible Loan, factoring, leasing etc. 
bonds, options, warrants etc. 
Pricing references P/E ratio, net tangible assets Interest spread 
Collateral No Yes (usually) 
Ownership Yes No 
Control Minority shareholders rights Loan covenants 
protection and board seat 
Impact ofB/S Reduce leverage Increase leverage 
Impact on cashflow Improve taiprove 
Impact on profit Improve Improve 
Exit mechanism of Public offering and trade sales Loan repayment 
capital provider 
Source: Asian Venture Capital Joumal 
The venture capital financing pops out to be a feasible alternative source of 
financing for emerging Chinese enterprises. (Of course, this applies universally to 
other Asian SMEs as well.) From a risk propensity and risk management point of 
view, venture capital may be a more readily available and longer-term financing in the 
post- Crisis era. 
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Entrepreneurs，Misconceptions for the Venture Capitalists 
Historically, the venture capital industry is considered to be a closed and 
private business circle. The entrepreneurs have a number of misconceptions towards 
the venture capital industry. The author recaps the 10 most common misconceptions: 
1. The demanding venture capitalists will control the company and dictate what the 
entrepreneurs shall do. 
2. Evolutionary business idea is the most important factor for considering an 
investment proposal. Management quality is a secondary consideration. 
3. Only investment proposal from companies with tangible products (either 
revolutionary, innovative, evolutionary products or substitutions) will be 
considered by venture capitalists. 
4. Personal reference is essential before a venture capitalist will consider a potential 
investment project. 
5. Venture capitalists are either interested in high-tech start-ups or expanding 
companies with well-established track record. 
6. Venture capitalists demand a risk premium on their investment and entrepreneurs 
can satisfy this requirement by providing reasonable investment return. 
7. Venture capitalists are concerned about investment performance and may demand 
annual cash dividends which may drain the company's cash resources during its 
development stage. 
8. Venture capitals are responsive risk-takers and quick decision-maker and disburse 
the investment money. 
9. Venture capitalists, being private investors, have no fixed investment time 
horizon and no rigid investment realisation requirement. 
10. Venture capitalist is a financing option for expanding enterprises. Entrepreneurs 
shall consider venture capital as alternative financing providers and treat them in 
exactly the same way as handling other banking relationship. 
With the establishment of industry association and the industry become more 
transparent to the business community，more and more people become familiar with 
this industry and most of the earlier misconception have been wiped out. However, a 
general perception still exists among the business community which considers venture 
capital as another form of alternative non-bank financing. The venture capitalists are 
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though to be unconventional commercial bankers accepting higher-than-normal risks 
and more willing in extending credits to SMEs. 
How Venture Capitalist can help 
Venture capitalists do not restrict themselves to providing alternative financing 
to SMEs in need. They are actually bridging the capital gap and helping the 
entrepreneurs to institutionalise a platform for future growth. The venture capitalists 
get this done by siphoning the necessary expansion capital and ftmiishing valued-
added management and strategic insights to the SMEs. 
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Five Stages of Small Business Growth" model 
« 
To exemplify how venture capitalists could fuel the business growth 
momentum from an academic perspective, the author will adopt the "Five Stages of 
Small Business Growth" modeP. 
^ ^ I ^ Q Q Q E ^ ^ H I I Major Business Strategy 
IStage I - obtaining customer and delivering the product / services. This stage is 
Existence characterised by a simple organisation with the owner-manager taking the 
lead. 
Stage II - after proving the business ideas are workable, it is a matter of revenue and 
Survival expenses management. It is a matter of the business's ability to generate 
positive cashflow to survive. The owner-manager may, at this point of 
time, seek professional advice to strategically position the business to chart 
out the future success. 
Stage III _ this is to maintain profitable status quo and get the necessary resources to 
Success grow. It concerns an important choice of whether to (a) exploit the 
company's accomplishments and expand or Qji) keep the company stable 
and sustains the profitability. 
Stage IV - Now the main business concem is "growth". The key management 
Take-Off problem is how to grow rapidly and how to finance that growth. This is 
also the time to build-up a full-fledged corporate infrastructure to prepare 
for the future growth. 
Stage V 一 Essentially, this is retum of investment to the anchor investors. The 
Resources management focus is to (a) consolidate and control the financial gains 
Maturity brought by rapid growth and � retain agile and responsive to changing 
business demands in light of expanding corporate size. 
The availability of different sources of capital, primarily debt or equity, 
depends primarily on the developmental phase and the probability of successful 
commercialisation. 
19 Neil C., Williams & Virginia L, Lewis. "The Five Stages of Small Business 
Growth". The Harvard Business Review. May - June 1983: 30 - 50. 
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Does this business idea work? 
The purpose of the initial stages (Existence and Survival) is to evolve a 
business to a point where it has three key elements that will spell success: 
1. an economically viable product or service with attractive markets; 
2. an established business plan that can be replicated; and 
3. a seasoned management team that has demonstrated that it can execute the 
business plan. 
Most business idea comes from brainstorming, for example, speculating on 
how the application of a technology can better fill customers' needs. Some successful 
businesses are even the result of serendipity or the accidental discovery of a desirable 
product or service. The idea is then refined, researched and tested on a very limited 
scale in the feasibility phase. The primary question to be answered in this phase is: 
"Does this business idea work?" Market research using secondary sources and initial 
evaluations of the business economics has to be performed to assure the attractiveness 
of continued investment of time and money. 
A key objective in this stage is to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
customer's needs and how the product or service may be modified to better meet their 
needs. During this phase, the venture begins to evolve into a business, and key people 
are added to build the management team. 
Scaling up business operations 
In the Success phase, the firm begins to scale up its operations to prove that it 
has a business formula that can be replicated and rolled-out for business success. The 
product is refined for efficient, low cost production, and pre-production lot sizes are 
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produced to show that consistent, acceptable units can be produced. An established 
selling approach is applied to a broader set of customers, such as those in a wider 
geographical area. The completely assembled key management team demonstrates 
that it has the ability to implement a plan that can address a wider, possibly national 
market. 
Fostering the corporate infrastructure as a platform of growth 
In the Take -offphase, major investments are made to achieve efficient, low-
cost, full-scale production and for full-scale market development. For some firms, the 
investment in manufacturing plant and equipment can be many millions and even 
billions. The investment can be for the purpose of introducing the product or service 
to a wider scope of customers, such as spending for advertising or to build a national 
sales force. Such investments may even be significantly costly than spending money 
to expand and upgrade the manufacturing facilities. This is especially true for service 
businesses. 
After highlighting this 5-stage model, the author now moves to how elaborate 
his idea ofhow the stages ofbusiness growth is associated with changing needs of 
financial and management resources and how venture capitalists could step in to help. 
Reducing risk level and dynamic financing needs 
The author is ofthe opinion that the duration of time needed by an individual 
firm to pass through the different phases is an important factor that influences the 
amount and kind of money that a firm can seek, and this timing also influences the 
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business，chances to obtain money. The longer the time to reach the later stages, the 
lower the chance (or more difficult) to obtain some sources of capital. 
The cash needs of a venture increase with each phase. The capital base shall 
be broadened as the company grows, and the costs of failure or exiting from the 
business a its later stage also increase. 
From a (credit) risk management viewpoint, each developmental stage should 
reduce uncertainty or risk and each phase should increase the probability of success of 
the business. 
All decisions to provide funds to a venture are tied to somewhat subjective risk 
and reward trade-offs. The higher the perceived uncertainty and risk, the fewer the 
sources of capital which will be available，and the higher the return demanded by 
investors who do participate. The lower the perceived uncertainty of successful 
commercialisation becomes, the more accessible financing will be. Furthermore, 
lenders are likely to demand less of a share in the company because the perceived 
market value of the firm will be greater. The process of moving a business through 
the phases must reduce uncertainty and improve the probability of success. 
The major sources of funds for firms in the earlier stage are, hence, restricted 
and commonly include 
1. Debt (for discussion purpose, we ignore the Renminbi convertibility and stability issue) 
2. Government Grants / Subsidies (quire uncommon for foreign-invested 
enterprise in China) 
3. Seed Capital / Equity and major Private Placement 
4. Venture Capital 
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Debts from banking sources are generally not a major source of flmds for 
ventures prior to the Take-Off stage. An entrepreneur may obtain loans to financing 
the business' initial operations using personal savings or assets as collateral. 
Lenders want low uncertainty of repayment and require collateral. Business 
does not develop sizeable and verifiable assets such as accounts receivable, inventory, 
and manufacturing equipment, until they reach the later stages. Government loans, if 
any, are tied to the assets of the firm, mostly to bricks and mortar, and they 
occasionally still require the personal guarantee ofkey management. 
Capital from individuals is often the key source of capital for most firms prior 
to the commercialisation phase. This is particularly true for the cash needed for the 
start-up firms at earlier stages. These funds are most often in the form of equity. 
Equity is supplied from the entrepreneur's own cash from savings and monthly cash 
that is provided because the entrepreneur and his associates often take a sub-standard 
wage during a venture's earliest phases. Equity can be raised by the entrepreneur's 
personal efforts to sell stock to a personal network of potential investors (in the 
Chinese business community, the buyers are usually personal fiiend, family members 
and relatives of the entrepreneur). Venture capital firms are a source of equity capital 
for start-up firms. 
Most often, venture capital is not available until the firm has reached the late-
Survival stage or early-Success stage, and possibly not until the firm is ready for 
Take-offs. Many venture capital firms want to invest where the time horizon is 
medium-to-long term, since they must liquidate their investments in 3 - 7 years and 
provide cash return to their investors over a finite period. 
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Linking Financing Needs and Stages ofBusiness Development 
The author summarises below the financing needs and source of funds for 
businesses at various stages of development. (Obviously, with the recent credit 
retrench and banker's reduced risk propensity, non-bank financing is being more and 
more important.) 
| M ^ E H I ^ 3 B j ^ B Major Strategy Financial Position Source of Fund 
IStage I - existence - start-up - Owner self-financed 
Existence - initial / seed capital - Family-financed 
Stage II - survival - sustain existing - other non-bank 
Survival operations fmancing 
- V C f i r m s 
Stage III - maintain profitable - seek self-sustaining - self-generated cash 
Success status quo - buildings financial - bank fmancing 
-deploy resources to back-bone - leasing / factoring 
grow companies 
Stage IV - growth - extensive CAPEX - issue commercial 
Take-Off - increased working paper 
capital need - syndicated loans 
Stage V - retum of investment - shareholders payoffs - securitization 
Resources - adding investor value - IPO 
Maturity 
To demonstrate how a venture capitalist could really help in propelling the 
growth of an SME, we could make reference to the exhibit that follows (see next 
page). 
This attached exhibit diagrammatically illustrates how venture capitalists 
could team up with owner-managers and helps to actualise their ambitious business 
plan. The venture capitalists provides the necessary seed and mezzanine financing 
which consolidated the enterprise's capital structure and built up a solid shareholders 
base. Venture capitalists and the owner-manager also worked together to nurture and 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This exhibit demonstrated and illustrated graphically 
1. How venture capitalist provides seed (and initial) financing to support a 
business concept and enriches the shareholder base, 
2. How venture capitalists support the business growth by introducing 
strategic and other partners to the investee company, 
3. How venture capitalists packaged and presented the investee company to 
institutional investors fur further broadening of the shareholder base as 
well as providing the necessary expansion capital for take-off, and 
4. How venture capitalists and institutional investors help the investee 
company to go public and attain maturity. 
All these are advice and services the investee companies cannot reasonably 
expect their ordinary bankers to provide. That's why the author would personally 
refer venture capitalist to "architect of shareholder value". 
Before analysing how venture capitalists select their target investee 
companies, evaluate a business, structure these direct investments deals and make 
investment decisions, we first take a look at the following typical investment structure 
of a private equity (more common term for Asian "venture capital") deals: 
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m ^ ^ S r ^ : 3 - 7 years 
Amount : US$ 2 - 5 million 
Exit Strategy : At least one identifiable exit strategy, ideally listing in 2 -
4 years 
Country : Growing economy with conducive government policies 
and / or regulations 
Industry : Growing industry and products in demand 
Company : Common selection criteria 
• proven management track record 
• up-to-date technology 
• proven business performance with growth 
potentiaVclear business strategy 
• competitive edge over competitors 
• good market position 
Stock Market : Reasonable market capitalisation with reasonable 
liquidity 
The author is of the opinion that what venture capitalist are buying into are: 
1. untarnished management integrity, 
2. forwardness in entrepreneur vision accompanied by viable business plan, 
and 
3. splendid growth potential. 
Key Investment Concerns ofVenture Capitalists 
Although venture capitalists are perceived to be risk-takers, they will be 
vigilant in doing their homework to mitigate their investment risks. Venture 
capitalists commonly will assume the role ofback-seat value-added business adviser. 
They usually take minority equity interests and count on the entrepreneur to take care 
ofthe daily business operations. Hence, management integrity is their utmost 
concern. 
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The venture capitalists are actually buying into "fundamental" and they need a 
reliable business partner as industrial operator to visualise the business plan. They 
will favour seasoned business partners who share with them the investee company's 
-strategic direction and positioning 
-corporate business information 
-management & operations control, and 
-upside ofbusiness success 
The author summarised venture capitalists' basic concerns to the "business 
fundamentals" and “reliable business partners" in the four key questions that follows: 
H Venture Capitalists, Question Typical Entrepreneur's Answers — 
How much is the up-side return Annualised IRR of 20% is the upside 
and downside risk? while the down-side is US$5 million plus 
US$1 million loan guarantees from 
shareholder. 
Who will be the other The management team and their track 
stakeholders and how they show record in the business. Their 
their commitments? responsibility and level of involvement in 
this project and their initial investment of 
US$3 million. 
How can you reach your Independent market research report, 
customers and what is the strategic action plan of the company plus 
market size? supplier / customer references. 
How can I realise my investment Identifiable IPO within 3 years plus put 
and when. option granted to investor from the 
management team. 
In particular venture capitalist will collect information of the industrial 
operator as they know this owner-manager shall be the one who drives the company 
and really understand the business. Again, the author summarised the venture 
capitalists' concem below: 
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• Key Management Quality Venture Venture Capitalists Concem 
Capitalists，will Look Into 
Market familiarity Management competence is the key 
element for all venture capitalists in 
considering a deal. 
Sustainable management efforts Existing management run investee 
company and venture capitalists need to 
ensure continuity of management team 
and company operation. 
Problem Solvers & Goal Seekers Management shall exhibit sound 
management visions and the ability to 
implement this vision. 
Trusted Business Partner Venture capitalists will work closed with 
management to "grow" the company, 
hence goal alignment is necessary. 
Management team's openness and their 
willingness to share business and 
operational information are also essential. 
Now, the author guesses we have to conclude that venture capitalists are not 
only risk-takers, they are cautious risk-takers. My industry experience indicated that a 
typical venture capital investment house seldom funds more than 2 - 5% of the 
potential investment deals they seriously analysed and evaluated. 
Gap Bridging: Self-Evaluation for Business Plans 
To increase the likelihood of being picked by venture capitalist and to get the 
necessary expansion capital, before going to meet venture capitalists, Chinese 
emerging business should bear in mind the main business and management questions 
highlighted above. These questions shall be the comer stone of venture capitalist's 
pre-investment due diligence. 
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These Chinese emerging businesses could also conduct a self-review on their 
business plan using the following suggested checklist: 
1 ^ Key Element Assessmei^ 
O^otQ 2°) Is the project or venture plan packaged in such a way that 
Packaging & it will facilitate busy venture capitalists in grasping the 
Presentation salient features of the deal in the shortest possible time? 
Deal Structuring Is the salient features of the deal structured in such a way 
that the potential investor will compel you and invest in 
your project? 
Market Research Is the market positioning of the company (include growth 
potential, industrial rivalry and other competitive forces) 
clearly illustrated? 
Financial Projection Is the financial projection sensibly presented using sound 
basis of assumptions? 
Management Team Could the illustration for management team members and 
their track records cast adequate confidence for potential 
investors? 
Retum and Exit Could both the investor and the existing stakeholders 
Mechanism generate reasonable retum and clear exit mechanism 
established. 
Final Test Ifthe presenter of a business plan take the perspective of 
a "potential investor", (1) are all salient deal features 
properly presented, (2) could investor concems 
adequately answered, and (3) will the presenter spend the 
time to consider investing in the project 
A key Chinese element not highlighted above is "Regulatory Issues". The 
author have to admit businesses operating in a dynamic and emerging market got to 
live with uncertainties. This uncertainty, however, could be mitigated by a through 
study ofenvironmental and regulatory framework that underlines the business 
operations. 
2° McCready, William. President ofNational Venture Capital Association, 
Hawaii Branch. 
113 
Key Elements in Structuring a Private Equity Deal 
The previous chapter highlights a typical investment deal structure for a 
private equity deal. The author does not intend and does not have the liberty 
previously to highlight how such investment structures are come up with, however, 
the author thinks this question could has be entangled. 
After highlight the venture capitalist's investment concerns, the following 
generalisation could be adopted as the broad guiding principal for private equity deals 
structuring, namely, 
1. Early (or timely) return of capital to venture capitalists. 
2. Premium paid for the risk taken by the venture capitalists in the early 
development stage of a SME. 
3. Other incentives ("kickers"). (These need not be monetary in nature.) 
4. Options to increase equity share or liquidate early. Either to share the 
upside or provide downside protection. 
5. Tax and legal considerations. 
Partnering with Venture capitalists: a Win-Win situation 
To be frank, the driving force underneath the choice of financing alternatives 
are, in most cases, returns to the business and provide of capital. The following 
hypothetical case illustrates a possible win-win situation after entrepreneur teams up 
with a venture capitalist. 
« 
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Financial Impact on Investee Company 
The following example illustrates the possibility of a win-win situation. It is 
also interesting to note that the entry of venture capitalists broadens the shareholder 
base and reduces bankers' perceived risk rating on the corporate capital structure. All 
these could increase the enterprise's capacity to raise further loan financing. 
To narrow down the scope of our hypothetical analysis, we only take a look at 
the expense side of the financial statements and ignored the synergy effect of teaming 
up of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. 
($ million) Owner-Managed Business Team up with Venture Capitalists 
(no venture capital involvement) 
Year 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
P/L Account 
iiir 200 260 338 200 260 338 
growth rate 30% p.a. 
Less: Interest @ 10%p.a. (80) (80) (80) (80) (60) (40) 
Profit before Tax m 1 ^ ~ " 258 ^ 0 ^ l m 
Profits tax @, say, 15% (18) (27) (39) (18) (30) (45) 
Profit after Tax 102 153 2 1 ~ 102 170 2 ^ 
Balance Sheet 
Assets, n e t ~ ~ 1,000 1.102 1,255 1,474 1,000 1,102 1,272 1,525 
Loans-short-term# 400 400 400 400 400 400 200 200 
Loans - long-term # 400 400 400 400 400 400 200 200 
Total debts 800 800 800 800— 800 800 400 400" 
Share capital 200 200 200 200 200 200 250 250 
Share premium 350 350 
Retained earnings 102 255 474 102 272 525 
Total capital 200 302 455 674 200 302 872 1,125 
Total debt and capital 1,000 1,102 1,255 1.474 1,000 1,102 1>272 1,525 
Financial Ratio Analysis ： > 
Total D/E 4.00 2.65 L76" 1.19 4.00 2.65 0^4^ 0.36 
Current Ratio» 1.00 1.10 1.26 1.47 1.00 1.10 2M 3.05 
Interest coverage 2.50 3.25 4.23 2.50 4 J 3 8.45 
* assume current assets / total assets = 40% 
# assume venture capitalists' subscription money is used to repay short-term & long-term loans @ 1:1 basis 
and venture capitalists come in on July 1 ofYear2. 
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Financial Impact on Investor / Shareholder 
My brief return analysis that follows indicated that despite entrepreneur share 
some of the up-sides to venture capitalists (who enjoys a 23% return), his own equity 
entitlements in monetary unit increased by 15% as well. 
Of course, this is only a simplified scenario analysis as no venture capitalist 
will disburse investment money to entrepreneurs for re-payment ofbank loans. 
Venture capitalists will always demand their investment money channelled to 
more productive sectors, however the author believes the point that a possible win-
win situation could thus rise has been made. 
Return Analysis Entrepreneur Venture 
Capitalist 
($ niillion) No teaming up with Teaming up with 
venture capitalists venture capitalists 
PAT @ IPO 迎 塑 253 
(Year 3) ^ = = 
Market 
capitalization 
Befored i lu t ion@P/El2x 2 , 6 3 2 3 , 0 4 0 3 , 0 4 0 
Value of enterprise attributing to 
-Owner 80% 2,105 2,432 
-Venture 20% 608 
capitalists 
Financial result of 个15.5% 23.3% 
strategic teaming 




Appendix I: Alternative Non-Bank Financing 
FmANCmG ALTERNATIVES ^ ADVANTAGES ” D I S A D V A N T A G E S “ 
Trade credit 
0 Provides short term borrowing by o Easier to obtain due to o Expensive (implicit 
stretching out payments to competitive pressures interest) 
suppliers o No formal instruments o Potential credit rating 
0 Usually financed by suppliers problems 
Accounts receivable assignment 
0 Receivable are assigned to lender o Flexible borrowing o May require periodic 
0 Company is responsible for o Immediately converts audit of receivables by 
collection receivables to cash lender 
0 Can borrow a specified percentage o Effective rate may be 
(usually around 80%) of current increased by delay in 
receivables crediting receipts 
0 Usually financed by finance 
companies and commercial banks 
Factoring 
0 Sale of receivables to third party o No collection o Expensive 
0 Can be with or without responsibilities (with o Commissions and credit 
notification to customers customer notification) risk will be hidden costs 
0 usually financed by finance o No credit risk o High interest rate 
companies and factoring 
companies 
Inventory loans 
0 Can employ floating liens, o Cost of financing may o May be available for 
warehouse receipts or trust receipts be lower than relatively small 
0 Financed by commercial banks receivables financing percentage (e.g., 50%) 
of inventory 
21 Adopted and extracted from "Guide to Obtaining Financing", Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 1985. 
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FmANC][NG ALTERNATIVES ^ ADVANTAGES ”DISADVANTAGES ~ 
Bankers' acceptance 
0 Draft drawn by a supplier on the o Facilitates trade of large o Commitment fees 
company's bank becomes an quantities of goods to be 
acceptance when accepted by bank shipped over long 
0 Collateral is goods being shipped distances 
0 Useful if seller is unwilling to o Acceptance can be 
extend unsecured trade credit due discounted 
to large size of order or in 
intemational trade 
0 Financed by commercial banks 
Mortgages 
0 Lien on real property used as o Long term financing o Requires down payment 
security for repayment of a debt o Costly to arrange 
0 Issued through a municipality o Location restrictions 
0 Interest may be tax free o Restrictive covenants 
0 Finance by financing companies requirements 
and commercial banks 
Leasing 
0 Used for asset acquisition or o No down payment o Residual value usually 
utilization (100% financing) goes to lessor 
0 Variety of leasing vehicles o Provides off balance o Higher cost than debt 
0 Lessor maintains ownership sheet financing o Value of improvements 
0 Payment in form of fixed o Less time consuming to to leased property may 
payments establish accrue to lessor 
0 Either financed by manufacturer's o Predictable costs 
finance subsidiaries, finance o Potential tax advantages 
companies, leasing companies and o Lessor may provide 




We seek to wrap-up our industry discussion by conducting an analysis for the 
China venture capital industry based on the conceptual framework put forth by 
Professor Michael E. Porter in 1980. 
By looking into the 5 competitive forces as proposed by Porter that determine 
an industry's profitability, we seek to identify where the China venture capital 
industry is and where it is going. Porter's model work well for economies where the 
m^ket operation is essentially deregulated i.e. a competitive market free from 
extensive government intervention. This is, definitely, not the case for China. The 
distortion effect of government policy will also be considered by the author. 
We will explore the suitability of the model's application to a semi-regulated 
economy and seek to incorporate certain China-specific institutional factors to enrich 
Porter's model. 
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There's no resting place for an enterprise in a 
competitive economy 
strategy is not the consequence of planning, 
but the opposite: its starting point. 
« 
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Michael Porter's Structoral Analysis ofIndustries 
This is an innovative conceptual framework put forth by Professor Michael E. 
Porter at Harvard Business School in 1980. This model is a useful conceptual 
framework in 
- determining long-term industry profitability 
- explaining supplier demand relationship 
- defining industry structure or underlying economic / technological characteristics 
- guiding business strategic planning to select strategies to ride the competitive 
forces and to attain the enterprise' competitive advantage. 
It is by far, the most commonly adopted analytical framework for industry 
analysis. The practical value of the framework builds upon its intuition in 
highlighting the 5 competitive forces that determine an industry's profitability. 
These 5 forces determines 
- the price (the entry Py^ or subscription structure in for venture capitalists) the 
enterprises can charge, the cost (finance risks and commitments) they have to 
bear and the investment they need to compete effectively in the industry. 
- the threat of new entrants that can limit the overall profit potential in the industry 
- power buyer and supplier (deals sourcing etc.) that can further "bargain away" the 
industry players' profits. 
- fierce competitive revelry that can erode profits by requiring higher cost of 
competing (say, legal expenses and debt-to-equity conversion terms etc.). 
- presence of close substitute products (other capital market alternatives) that can 
limit ( or "guide") the venture capitalists' entry price without inducing 
substitution and eroding industry volume. 
為 
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Michael Porter，s Five-Forces Model 
The 5 competitive forces that determine an industry's profitability, according 
to Porter, are: 
1. intensity of rivalry among industry competitors 
2. threat of New Entrants 
3 • threat of Substitutes 
4. bargaining power of Buyer 
5 • bargaining power of Suppliers 
\h] Threat of New Entrants 
• 
[a] Intensity of 
[d] Suppliers Rivalry among [e] Buyer 
Industry competitors • 
• 
[c] Threat of Substitutes 
Firm are not prisoners of their industry structure. Through their adopted 
strategies, firms can influence the five forces and therefore shape industry structure, 
making it either more or less attractive. Such strategies are a double-edged sword 
since a firm, after gaining a critical mass, can destroy industry structure and 
profitability as readily as it can improve it. 
The ability of firms to shape industry structure places a particular burden on 
industry leaders as their actions can have a disproportionate impact on structure for 
1 2 2 
their perceived firm size and their influence over buyers / suppliers and other 
competitors. 
Industry Structure and Equilibrium 
Industry profitability and viability is a function of the dynamic equilibrium 
between the supply and demand side. Industry structure determines how rapidly 
competitors could add new capacity. The effectiveness of entry barriers underpins the 
likelihood that new entrants will enter an industry and stir up the price equilibrium. 
The intensity of rivalry plays a "determining role" to decide whether existing firms 
will expand their capacity aggressively or choose other competitive actions. 
Our initial analysis on China venture capital industry will focus on the 
following: 
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[a] Industry Rivalry Factors 
0 industry growth & institutional investors involvement 
0 over-capacity escalating competition 
0 product differences & brand identity 
0 concentration and balance 
0 competition from corporate ventures 
0 exit barriers 
[b] Entry Barriers 
0 legal constrains / government policy and investment restrictions 
0 brand identity 
0 access to quality deal flow 
0 capital requirement 
[c] Substitution Threat Determinants 
0 relative performance of other capital market substitutes 
0 investees' propensity to substitute 
[d�Suppliers (investees) Bargaining Power Determinants 
0 presence of substitute inputs 
0 venture capitalists concentration 
[e] Buyer (venture capitalists) Bargaining Power Determinants 
0 differentiation of inputs from venture capitalists 
0 buyer switching costs vs. enterprise switching costs 
0 buyer deals in pipeline flow & portfolio strategy 
0 substitute products and brand identity 
[a] Industry Rivalry Factors 
0 Lidustry growth & institutional investors involvement 
The industry growth is a function of relative supply of (a) readily-available public 
financing, bank credit and other private sector financing (such as securities market 
and debt market) against (b) availability of a relatively-expensive pool of venture 
capitalist's money within the prevailing regulatory and stakeholders right protection 
fi:amework. 
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The institutional investors' participation greatly enhances market efficiency and the 
overall regulatory environment. These institutional investors also help to develop a 
local pool ofventure capital talents who are more well-positioned to boost the 
acceptance and growth of venture capital industry in the local business community. 
Almost every leading local conglomerates and corporations have, somehow, 
institutionalised an in-house business development function whose mandate greatly 
resemblance and mimics that of their counterparts in the venture capital community. 
0 Over-capacity and escalating competition 
Over-capacity is a proliferating problem for most Asian countries and is draining 
the investment return of venture capitalist by pushing up the entry price. The 
reason for this could be categorised as “too many money chasing too little quality 
deal flow". 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this over-capacity problem worsens in the post-
Crisis era. Not all venture capital houses could have the liberty to change their 
inter-country assets allocation limits (as this may rigidly be prescribed by their 
investment mandate). Venture capitalists investing in the “less-desimble,, Asian 
countries may encounter undue pressure to invest. This pressure may force them to 
accept unreasonably-high entry price commanded by "promising" local 
entrepreneurs to hasten their effort in disbursing idle investment capital. 
These “promising” enterprises easily stands out among their less-desirable local 
counter-parts and could easily leverage their position in negotiating with the "deal-
starving" venture capitalists. 
0 Product (and value added) differences & brand identity (for pre-IPO placement) 
To alleviate the negative impact of price competition which tends to erode the 
industry's profitability (industry benchmark for investment return typically stands 
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as high as 25% - 30% p.a.), non-price competition elicited. 
Professional venture capitalists differentiate themselves by the wide range of value-
added services (including strategic planning, further fund-raising assistance and 
human resources advisory) they offered to investee companies. Accordingly, 
brand-identity ofinvestment houses is highly sought by investees who usually 
associate the capability of investment houses with their established image and brand 
names. This is ofparticular importance for investees seek to expand their 
shareholder base in preparation for a forth-coming IPO. 
0 Concentration and balance 
Venture capitalists and their in-house risk management experts typically command 
a desirable make-up of the portfolio of investee companies. Such asset allocation 
requirements are typically expressed in terms of assets concentration limit with 
reference to industry (economic sector) or country concentration. 
As the shift in investment preference and focus among the competing investment 
houses are generally in line with the changes in asset allocation of their respective 
competitors, this potentially elevates the industry competition. (This is self-
explanatory as it goes without saying that bargaining power of investee companies 
in certain favoured industry will multiply in this respect.) 
0 Corporate stakes (competition from corporate ventures) 
Venture capitalists, who behave as a pure-financial investor, will be return-oriented 
and will not have an innate preference for certain industry sectors. This is not, 
however, the case for corporate venturers. 
This group of investors could be labelled as cash-rich conglomerate's in-house 
� venture capitalists whose pricing strategies are generally in line with that of venture 
capitalists from independent investment houses. However, due to their source of 
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capital, they may prefer investee companies in certain sectors (say, a wooden 
fumiture manufacturing group's in-house corporate venturer may prefers an up-
stream forestry plantation project) and more willing to paid a higher-than-normal 
entry price. 
Corporate venturer's presence will potentially drive up the overall entry price into 
investee companies in certain industrial or economic sector. 
0 Exit barriers 
Owing to relative limited exit alternative (due to a under-developed M&A market in 
China etc.), IPO and trade-sale may be the most viable exits for venture capitalists. 
This imbalance market will inevitable stir-up industry competition due to the 
inherent preference of the capital and M&A markets. 
Currently, those PRC investee companies have an established brand-name and 
market distribution channels are typically favoured as a potential IPO candidate and 
take-over target. The "qualified" potential investee companies thus have 
exceptional bargaining power. 
[b] Entry Barriers 
0 Legal constrains / government policy and investment restrictions 
There are virtually no entry barrier for foreign (or domestic) capital into the PRC 
business community. However, there is significant legal restrictions on the 
structuring aspects. This greatly limits the creativity on deal structuring for 
seasoned venture capitalists. 
Currently, foreign participation on a number of industries such as retail / department 
stores, petroleum refineries and telecommunications are restricted and highly 
« 
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regulated. (The PRC government claims that the main thrust for imposing such 
foreign-equity participation is to protect infant domestic enterprises that lack the 
financial resources and state-of-the-art expertise to survive the sudden influx of 
foreign competitors.) Seasoned venture capitalists are all prepared to spare 
additional efforts to shatter these regulatory constraints. 
0 Brand identity 
Despite there are no effective entry barrier for foreign investment capital, the 
leading domestic corporations (as potential investee companies) seeking foreign 
investors generally favour well-known (or high-profile ) investment houses which 
are perceived to be better-positioned to create value-added synergy effects among 
their extensive portfolio of investee companies. 
0 Access to quality deal flow 
In a country with relative under-developed channel of information flow within the 
business community (such as China), there is little or no publicly-available 
information on potential deals. There is also no open forum where venture 
capitalists could meet the potential investees to match their capital needs. New 
entrant venture capital houses to this market may face significant problems in their 
start-up phase. 
This could be a difficult task for independent venture capital houses who does not 
have any commercial banking / investment banking affiliates to help them in deals 
sourcing. The new-entrant's costs of pioneering and tapping into new markets 
could be high! This strive could also be time-consuming as well. 
0 Capital requirement 
Venture capital, as the name suggest, is an inherently high-risk long-term 
investment alternative. The investors shall be prepared to have their investment 
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capital lock-up for at least 3 - 5 years before they could reap a reasonable retum. 
Taking into account the relative long-term nature of venture capital investments, the 
supply of capital is highly restricted. Supply of venture capital mainly come from 
sophisticated high-worth individuals and established corporations who has adequate 
recurrent income from a matured portfolio of investments (which could mitigate the 
high risk of venture capital investment). It is not easy task to find new source of 
capital, in particular, during this post-Crisis era. 
[c] Substitution Threat Determinants 
Venture capital is a typical non-bank financing open to emerging / developing 
enterprises and expansion projects whereby a typical commercial bank usually 
perceive the business risk to be too high for their credit assessment exercise. 
Commercial banks emphasis risk management and seldom extend credit (in 
retum for an interest spread) to emerging / developing enterprise and / or expansion 
investment projects. Other typical non-bank financing include "project financing" 
which is somewhat restricted to projects with a visible set-up of investments. 
To finance emerging / developing enterprises and expansion projects, equity-
related securities (either listed or unlisted) is a common alternative. 
0 Relative price performance of other capital market substitutes 
The higher the price of other capital market substitutes to the investee companies, 
the lower will be the threat to venture capital products in view of the high cost of 
venture capital financing involved. 
0 Investees' propensity to substitute 
This is predominantly a function of availability of other capital market products. If 
the market expects retum on capital market products to soar, more capital market 
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resources will be available to the investee company at a lower price. Consequently 
bring a much higher substitution risks for venture capital products. 
However, for committed investments pending completion or fund disbursements, 
the investees' propensity to substitute is very low as the venture capitalists should 
be able to lock-in the deal by demonstrating their value-adding capabilities to the 
investee companies. 
[d�Suppliers (investee) Bargaining Power Determinants 
It is not easy to give a precise definition of supplier and buyer within the 
China venture capital industry context. However, for illustrative purpose, "suppliers" 
are being defined as potential investee companies (seeking venture capital-type 
financing) and is broadly defined to include existing majority shareholders as well as 
existing management (usually owner-manager) of the investee companies. 
(Accordingly, "buyers" are being defined as providers of venture capital-type 
financing.) 
0 Presence of substitute inputs 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, other banking and non-banking financial 
products are competing with venture capitalists. However, none of these 
competitors could match the value-adding capability of venture capitalists. 
Investees seeking mere financial resources will, typically, tum to other non-venture 
capitalist products whereas investees seeking non-financial assistance will normally 
tum to venture capitalists. 
0 Venture capitalists concentration 
In the post-Crisis era, polarisation of enterprises become more conspicuous. In the 
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post-Crisis liquidity squeeze and deteriorating business operating climates, 
enterprises are either struggling for survival or delivering exceptional (in the post-
Crisis standard) financial performance to its investors. 
Venture capitalists, despite their high risk propensity, will cluster around and 
compete among each other for the opportunity invest in the healthier companies and 
providing expansion capital for them. These group of"healthy companies", on 
knowing their value, will ask for high entry price and will even shopping around 
different houses to bargain for a good price (i.e. demanding for a high entry 
premium). 
[e] Buyer (venture capitalists) Bargaining Power Determinants 
0 Differentiation of inputs from venture capitalists 
Venture capitalists with established local and overseas market connections and track 
record have very high negotiation power. They have already demonstrated their 
impeccable ability to deliver a value-adding service to investees and have a higher 
chance to create synergy between their portfolio of investee companies. 
Those venture capital houses associated with investment banks or commercial 
banks will have additional bargaining power as their could (potentially) bring 
additional financial resources and other expertise to the investees. 
On the other hand, smaller independent venture capital houses have relatively 
limited bargaining power and thus being forced to commit themselves to more risky 
(or less profitable) projects. This group of venture capital houses are not competing 
head-on with their larger peer groups. They tend to be more specialised and 
targeted at a particular market niche. "Specialisation" is the commonly-adopted 




0 Buyer switching costs vs. enterprise switching costs 
For committed deals ^>ending completion or actual fund disbursement), hurdles of 
switching cost for both buyer and supplier are exceptionally high. This is, however, 
not the case before the deal is committed. During the earlier negotiation and deals 
structuring stages, there are virtual no switching cost for both two sides. 
0 Buyer deals in pipeline flow & portfolio strategy 
Judging from the overwhelming uninvested idle capital earmarked for China direct 
investment, the smaller venture capital houses with less strong deal flows and 
potential projects in pipeline may face undue pressure from their shareholders / 
investors to perform i.e. to have the idle capital committed as soon as possible. 
Accordingly, they may develop a tendency of accepting less desirable investment 
project and exercising less bargaining power at their side. This, however, may not 
be the case for large venture capital houses who have a broader base of shareholders 
/ investors as well as a more matured portfolio of investee companies. 
On top of the pressure to perform, the venture capital houses may "waive" their 
negotiation and bargaining power in their strive to attain their respective (in-house 
designated) desirable portfolio balance and asset allocation targets. 
0 Substitute products and brand identity 
The competition from substitute products (essentially other non-bank alternative 
financing) are only limited taking into account the higher risk-tolerance level of 
venture capitalists and the peculiar nature of the private equity deals. 
The private equity nature and the value-adding services, however, generally favours 
larger private equity houses who are perceived to possess the necessary financial 
and other management skill and carry a premium brandname. To be frank, the 
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reputation ofthe investment house, at times, may be the most important decision 
criterion in the eyes of a suppler. 
Refining Michael Porter's Model and Incorporating China Elements 
The above discussions demonstrated the Venture Capital industry to be a 
"human" based value-adding service. This also exemplified the importance ofhuman 
factors (and interaction between buyers and suppliers) that features the industry 
growth factors. Apart from providing expansion capital, "value-adding strategic 
advice" is another important element in venture-capital type financing. 
On top of this, China-specific legal and regulatory constraints should be the 
other force guiding the development of venture capital industry. 
Taking into the Chinese peculiarity, "Value and Management" should be the 
conditioning factor underlying "Rivalry among Industry Players". This is the hurdle 
that distinguishes a seasoned venture capitalist from a conventional one. 
As the author have hinted at the beginning of this chapter, the "Legal and 




"Legal and Regulatory Environment" 
(investor and minority protection) 
\h] Threat of New Entrants 
• 
[a] Intensity of 
Rivalry among 
[d] Suppliers Industry competitors [e] Buyer 
focused at 
‘‘Value and Management" 
[c] Threat of Substitutes 
Value and Management 
In the human respect, "Value and Management" should be incorporated to 
Porter's model. This should be part of the rivalry among industry competitors. In 
economic terms, the industry players are competing in the “monopolistic competition" 
spectrum and engage in fierce non-price competition in the "value and management" 
aspect. 
These two factors, in my opinion, means cementing the three forces that drive 
the growth and operations of a JV, 
1. people, 
2. leadership and 
3. strategy into action. 
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This concept emerged from the author's prior experience that the PRC joint 
venture partners might have a "hidden agenda" when they entered into JV agreement. 
Sino-foreign j oint ventures O^oth equity and contractual) are, by far, the most 
popular forms of vehicles for foreign direct investment (especially for the foreign 
venture capitalists investing into China). Typically, the Chinese partners usually have 
affiliations with other companies handling things like supplying raw materials to the 
JV and handling product distribution for JV. This pertinence is usually considered as 
a key decision criterion for foreign investors in assessing and choosing a Chinese JV 
partner. 
In most cases, the JVs are actually a way of taking out profit from these areas. 
It goes without saying that foreign investors shall look out for hidden agenda at their 
Chinesejoint venture partners' side. In most circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain 
the real co-investment intention of the partners. 
The basic ideas are: 
Value ~ the ultimate objective of all business 
� o + e ^ . " � � organisations. 
Value & Mgmt: Management — exercises control over the other 
economic elements of inputs and conduct an orchestrated 
^^ adeTS^ ^^  operations toward the value production. 
1. Value 
"Value" points toward the ultimate stakeholders. In westem business world, 
the predominant goal is to produce profits and growth for the benefit of the company's 
shareholders. In PRC, this can be a complicated situation as it may be hard to locate 
the real stakeholders. Before entering into any private equity deal in China, the 
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venture capitalists (and the foreign investors) shall ensure thejoint venture partners 
0>etween the Chinese and foreigner partners as well as among the group of foreign 
partners). 
Typical examples that may lead to nightmares include marriage between 
1. a PRC joint venture partner seeking access to foreign manufacturing 
technology transfer and a foreign partner whose goal is to penetrate PRC 
domestic market without any real intention of technology transfer, and 
2. a foreign financial investor (say a venture capitalist) seeking to reap 
medium-term financial success and a foreign industrial operator who 
seeks to establish a Chinese strategic outpost for long-term market 
development and market leadership. 
II. Management 
"Management" exercises control over the other economic elements of inputs 
and conduct an orchestrated operation toward the value production. Specifically, 
management plans and organises, leads, and controls the business operations. They 
are also responsible for establishing strategy and action plans for strategy 
implementation. Their behaviour pattem is，in tum, shaped by their value. 
Where the management (typically not appointed by the venture capitalists) will 
share the management vision, strategic planning direction, financial and operational 
information with the venture capitalists (and other stakeholders) determines the 
venture capitalists' ability to deliver value-adding advice to the invest companies. 
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Putting Competitive Strategy into Action 
In summary, "value and management" means cementing (1) strategy, (2) 
people and (3) leadership together and turning their brainchild into productive action 
steps. 
This means base on an agreed-upon and recognised value, management 
formulated a business strategy that uniquely positions the enterprises or long-term 
prosperity. To transform this strategy into results, the management will formulate a 
strategic action plan which seeks attainment of corporate goal through people 
(including staff members, suppliers and customers) under their leadership and 
command. 
Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Foreign investors investing into China could not structure their investment 
strategy and projects at their own will. Typical in most emerging markets, the foreign 
investors encounter a number of legal hurdles which regulated their efforts in realising 
their PRC market penetration endeavours. Even for a foreign investors to acquire 
interests in another foreign-invested PRC enterprises (not to mention a debt-ridden 
State-owned Enterprise), the buyer should undergo an extensive time-consuming and 
expensive legal procedures (see box that follows for some of these legal requirements) 
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Registration ofFIEs as Corporate Shareholders or Sponsors Several Provision (Promulgated 
October 10，1995) 
This provision applies to FIEs which invest in a limited liabilities company or a company 
limited by shares in their own name and using their own assets and are registered as 
shareholders or sponsors of such companies. This regulation describe the circumstances 
under which a FIE may register as shareholders / sponsors of such company and the 
documents that to be submitted to the original supervising registry when such enterprise 
invest as shareholders /sponsors. This regulation also prohibits a company from investing in 
other companies using more an aggregate of more than 50% of its net assets. 
China Company Law QPromulgated December 29, 1993 & Effective July 1，1994) 
It is stipulated that a company may invest in other limited liability companies but the 
aggregate amount of investments may not exceed 50% of the investing company's net 
assets. It is also stipulated that merger and acquisition of companies may take the form of 
"merger by absorption" and "merger by new establishment" and give details as to how these 
procedures are to be effected. 
Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance (Revised) Catalogue (Promulgated: December 31， 
1997) 
This guideline lists those industries that are encouraged, restricted and prohibited with 
respect to foreign investment. 
(Source: Allison Shaw, Editor, and China Direct tivestor) 
Legal Aspects of Joint Venture Restructuring 
Since China promulgated its first law onjoint ventures using Chinese and 
foreign capital in 1979，joint ventures have been the most important vehicles 
siphoning foreign investments into China. From time to time, thesejoint ventures 
may have to be restructured by the investors and, at times, these changes are so 
fundamental that warrants extensive regulatory and legal scrutiny and sanction. 
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Chinese law requires all establishment of Sino-Foreignjoint venture 
companies be governed by Chinese law and approval by relevant Chinese government 
authorities. The law also specifies the "organisational documents" of ajoint venture, 
which shall be approved by relevant authorities and typically consists of 
1 • feasibility studies, 
2. joint venture contract, and 
3. articles of association. 
Within this set of comprehensive documents, the following important 
organisational aspects, inter alia, will be specified, (1) the business purpose, (2) total 
planned investments, (3) aggregate equity contribution, (4) debt financing scheme and 
(5) important aspects of corporate governance (including composition ofboard 
members and manner in which senior executive is appointed). 
This is necessary for Chinese government to ensure the proposed investment 
in line with central government policies. Any subsequent change to the 
aforementioned items requires changes in the organisation documents and prior 
government approval is required. 
The following paragraphs^^ list out typicaljoint venture restructuring 
situations which requires prior government approval: 
22 Li, Xiaoming and Xu, Richard. ‘‘Legal Issues Surrounding Restructuring of 
Joint Ventures “. China Law and Practice Guide. August 1998: 27-35. 
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L Change ofInvestment 
Any change of registered share capital, change in thejoint venture parties' 
relative equity interest in thejoint venture as well as thejoint venture's authorised 
level of debt-raising requires government approval. 
Legal complications involved here may include "additional" central 
government approval if the increased total investments (total registered capital plus 
debt) exceeds US$30 million. Statutory debt-to-equity ratio as well as a 20%-equity 
ceiling for contribution-in-kind (say technological transfer) are being imposed. Due 
care should be exercised to ensure these statutory ratios and ceilings are strictly 
observed before AND after the joint venture restructuring. 
II. Change of Parties 
Change of joint venture parties is always a major change that requires approval 
from the Chinese government authorities that originally approved thejoint venture 
and a unanimous approval of thejoint venture's directors attending the board meeting. 
Securing this approval may be time-consuming and using an offshore special purpose 
holding vehicle is a method commonly adopted to avoid the Chinese regulatory hurdle 
over change ofjoint venture ownership. 
140 
III. Change in Management 
The general rule is the party that controls the board of ajoint venture also 
controls its management. A change in management of ajoint venture is often caused 
by the change in equity holding structure. 
IV. Change ofBusiness 
Parties to ajoint venture may change the business scope or line ofbusiness of 
a particularjoint venture. However, this change must be approved by the relevant 
govemment authorities and by a unanimous board decision. On top of this, attention 
should also be given to the following issues: 
0 Investment policies. 
The Chinese govemment ^)eriodically) updates the foreign investment guidelines 
and restrictions may apply to joint ventures in certain industries. Any change of 
thejoint venture business should stay clean at all times such restrictions. 
0 Additional Feasibility Study. 
The joint venture may be required to prepare a new feasibility study report on the 
new business undertaken by the joint venture as if the joint venture is in the 
process of obtaining its initial approval from relevant govemment authorities. 
0 Tax Consequence. 
Chinese tax laws encourages joint ventures to engage in long-term 
manufacturing, high-tech and infrastructure projects by giving generous tax 
holidays. Such privilege would be lost if thejoint venture was no longer 
engaging in the original encouraged industry. 
z 
141 
Merger and Acquisitions Opportunities Ahead 
In the context of Asian Financial Crisis and the wide-anticipated growth 
slowdown in China, foreign strategic investors with a clear understanding of Chinese 
reality combined with a focus on neatly-organised investment strategy can be 
expected to encounter more flexible officials and more sophisticated Chinese business 
partners. 
The legal infrastructure system is now largely in place for creative and 
pragmatic investment structures. Dedicated and properly constituted negotiation 
teams from foreign investors are more likely to succeed. 
Foreign Acquisition of State-Owned Enterprises 
Since the 15th National Communist Party Congress in September 1997，the 
green light seems to have been given by China's highest authorities that Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises are “for sale". In December 1997，the Chinese Central 
Economic Work Conference outlined five principles guiding the SOE reform. 
It appears to the observers that the theme of China's SOE reform campaign is 
“zhuada fangxiao,, - literally, "grasp the large (SOEs) and release the small (SOEs)". 
Hence, the State is perceived to be divesting medium and small-sized SOEs and 
strengthening and streamlining the business operation of large SOEs. 
More than ever, foreign investors are needed to provide capital and modem 
management techniques to the old-fashioned SOEs. The Chinese government, 
however, have yet to formulate adequate rules and regulations with respect to foreign 
investors' acquisition of SOEs. Foreign companies could only acquire the assets of 
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SOEs through their PRC joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Up to 
now, foreign investors are still not expressly permitted to directly acquire State-
Owned (legal person) shares of listed or unlisted companies. 
The author expects foreign investors will soon be permitted to acquire interest 
in SOEs and this shall be the future topic that calls for numerous attention and 
spotlights. 
Sum Up: Legal Aspects of China Investment Projects Structuring 
To sum up, despite numerous regulatory restrictions and constraints, the 
creative foreign investors should still be able to find a way to structure their China 
investment strategies and action plans. 
The author believe the next China Fever (after cooling of the early-1990 one) 
shall be fuelled by Chinese government's opening up of the private equity market 
which allows foreign investors to acquire equity shares (and even controlling interest) 
in domestic enterprises. 
One thing we have to bear in mind is: whether the Second Wave of China 
Fever could crystallise or not is a matter ofhow Chinese government could foster a 






From what we have shared in the earlier chapters on (1) China foreign direct 
investments, (2) evolution of venture capital industry in more matured markets, 
(3) Asian entrepreneur's peculiar requirements for expansion capital, as well as (4) the 
dissection on the industry growth forces in China, the author will propose some ideas 
on 
4. Critical success factors for venture capital house operating in China, 
5. Model venture capital investing house, and 
6. Road-map for a 21 st Century Model Investment House. 
This chapter intends to be a wrap-up for the project and endeavours to 
associate (1) China investment climate, (2) regulatory concerns, and (3) business 
practices to devise a strategic China investment plan for a venture capital house. 
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Critical Success Factors for Venture Capital Houses Operating in China 
The author considers the following to be critical success factors for venture 
capital houses operating in China: 
1. look for proven service concepts that can be transplanted into China 
2. team up with local or foreign industrial partner 
3. conduct extensive market research 
4. legal concerns (investment retractions & regulatory frameworks) 
5. undertake extensive pre-acquisition due diligence 
6. maintain active and supportive oversight of investees 
(This set of critical success factor should be universal to venture capital houses 
whose do not specialise in any particular industry. If a particular venture capital 
house seeks to specialise in certain industrial sector, adequate industry-specific 
knowledge should be an additional critical success factor.) 
We will further look into this set of critical success factors in the following 
section. 
1. Looks for proven service concepts that can be transplanted into China 
Experience learned by entrepreneurs from established mature market could be 
applied in an "anticipatory basis" in China. This necessitates application of 
sophisticated market research and demand forecast techniques in a well-defined target 
market segment. This exercise should aim at catching emerging business 
opportunities in response to local market's stage of economic development, 
demographic pattem and GDP consumption power) growth. 
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The pioneering foreign operators started setting up outposts in strategic 
locations in major Chinese cities well before eruption of market consumption power 
being recognised and identified by their competitors. Instead ofbeing a mere follower 
who choose to wait for the trend to emerge and then ride on it, they strive to initiate a 
ripple and tum it into a new wave of customer demand. Their pioneering and 
forward-looking PRC expansion plan give rise to their superior market position and 
profile which, in tum, substantiated their market shares, leadership and sustainable 
super-normal profits. 
A number ofWestem-style chain of fast-food shops and hyper-markets who 
already became Chinese household names (such as McDonalds, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, Carrefour and Sam's Club) are typical successful examples in anticipating 
PRC local market demand. 
To mitigate the market diversity and sophisticated market segmentation, 
venture capital houses could opt to specialise itself in certain market segment, say a 
particular geographic segment (say Shanghai municipal or Guangdong province) or 
industrial sector (say light manufacturing, retail or aeronautical products). 
2. Team up with local or foreign industrial partner 
Maintaining a profitable business operation in an emerging and dynamic 
market like China is not an easy task. Conducting business in emerging market where 
the market definition are loose, legal regulatory framework are less predictable and, 
occasionally, facing uncertain government industrial policy requires a well-balanced 
pool of management talent with a board spectrum of knowledge. 
* 
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The techniques required include (a) unprecedented forward-looking 
management vision, (b) unreserved management commitment with well-defined 
business focus, (c) uncompromising determination to excel in the market segment and 
(d) arduous and sustainable effort in building a strong corporate infrastructure and 
coherent policy to implement shared corporate goals and cultures. 
All these inputs could be sought from a well-established industrial operator 
who already mastered the prerequisite manufacturing expertise, management know-
hows and ability to create a full-spectrum customer reach in China. The ideal case is 
teaming-up with a local industrial operator who posses the market knowledge and 
established a national-wide distribution network together with a foreign industrial 
operator who could bring in state-of-the-art manufacturing know-hows and workshop 
techniques. 
3. Conduct extensive market research 
China domestic consumer market should be considered a fragmented market 
with highly complicated segmentation due to its (1) varying cultures, (2) volatile 
customer demands, and (3) geographic disparity (stages of economic development in 
different provinces). Newcomers to the Chinese market should avoid taking a gross 
generalisation and over-simplification attitude in formulating their China business 
plan. (Significant difference in customer preference could exist even in the same 
geographic area.) 
The fundamental factors shaping local customer demand should be adequately 
understood before product launching and marketing. This shall be the most important 
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step in achieving an adequate market penetration and coverage for all business 
managers in China. 
It stands to reason that a market research with adequate coverage within a 
well-defmed target market segment is indispensable. This is the fundamental in 
assessing the commercial viability of all business ventures in China. 
To venture capital houses, this means they have to not only thoroughly assess 
the width and depth of a potential market, but also focus on more fundamental issues: 
does the market really exist in terms of actual consumption power? It is uncommon to 
see failure of"promising" investments in "promising" market sector due to inability 
to channel "promising" consumption power into “real” customers orders. 
4. Legal concerns (investment retractions & regulatory frameworks) 
In light of the semi-open and the highly-regulated market structure, the overall 
legal and regulatory frameworks shall be sufficiently understood and dissected to 
minimise unplanned disruption to the business operation. 
This is a flmdamental concem for both the venture capitalists and business 
operators. 
5. Undertake extensive pre-acquisition due diligence 
Taking into account the problems highlighted within this report, in particular, 
hidden agenda of the (foreign and local) co-investors, their divergent risk-reward 
matrix and strategic planning priorities, an absolute requirement to perform extensive 
due diligence is thus emerged. 
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The investment premises and criteria of the other co-investors should be 
thoroughly explored and understood. The potential investment opportunities and their 
target markets, should also be evaluated on a global / regional perspective. 
One ofthe key issues venture capitalists should address is: is there any adverse 
hidden agenda behind the business partner's business plan which is detrimental to 
building a long-term mutual-beneficial relationship? 
6. Maintain active and supportive oversight of investees 
As highlighted in this report, the fundamental difference between a bank 
creditor and a venture capitalist is the value-adding advice and exchange of 
management ideas. The venture capital houses should maintain an active and 
supportive oversight for their portfolio companies (e.g. frequent site visits and close 
contacts with the business managers). This is of particular importance to co-investors, 
despite being leaders in their particular business sector, who do not have a full-
spectrum and diversified understanding of Chinese business practices and techniques. 
Prescription for a Model Venture Capital Investment House 
It's nature for readers to raise the following question, “In light of the given set 
of successful factors, which venture capital firms are the most likely to succeed?”. 
My ideas for answering this question is “ ... it is those houses who have secured 
access to adequate financial resources and established in-house corporate 
infrastructure will excel in this competitive industry!" 
149 
More specifically, these potential final contestants for future star performers in 
the venture capital industry are those with: 
1. Adequate infrastructure and personnel 
Firms have an extensive network oflocal investment professionals in each local 
country have a higher likelihood to succeed. The differentiating feature for these 
houses are having local investment managers (who have acute local business 
expertise) work together with regional officers (who brings in regional / global 
perspective) on potential investment deals. In light of increased competition for 
deals, intra-regional co-operation to source potential investment could be an 
added advantage. 
2. Vast financial resources. 
Firms being part of larger (global or regional) financial institutions which can 
reduce reliance on outside limited partners for financial resources also have a 
higher likelihood to succeed. 
3. Diversifiedfinancial and management skills. 
In light of the rapid-changing and demanding requirements in the post-Crisis 
arena, those houses with strong corporate finance skills and M&A knowledge 
having a higher chance to survive and prosper in the demanding and increasing-
sophisticated market. 
4. Regional investment flexibility. 
Firms have regional fimds, without pre-set country or industry allocation, thereby 
providing investment flexibility could have superior chance to survive in the 
post-Crisis era — they are free from undue pressure to invest. 
Road-map for a 21st Century Investment House 
In light of the high risks associated with emerging market investment, from a 
risk management point of view, venture capital houses should focus on providing 
expansion capital i.e. to capture opportunities from enterprise that have passed the 
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risky development stage and looking for expansion capital. These enterprises already 
demonstrated reasonable proof on viability ofbusiness, management capabilities, and 
competitive edge. 
To boost the overall portfolio retum, a certain percentage (say 5 - 10%) of the 
fimd could be allocated to more risky areas (say promising greenfield investments) 
which may offer tremendous investment retums "potentially". Blindly following and 
transplanting the US model of concentrating in greenfield start-up high-tech 
businesses does not appear to be a sound approach for Asian venture capital industry. 
Another principle that should be observed is avoid the "commitment 
escalation" approach in the strive to tum-around under-performing portfolio investees. 
Once a less-than-desirable investment decision is make, a more direct approach to 
alleviate this situation is “ wiping out from balance sheet" instead of contributing 
additional resources in the hope oflooking for emergence of a tum-around plan. In an 
emerging market, choices available to venture capitalists in tuming around a non-
performing investee companies are more limited than in matured markets. 
The author endeavours to sketch a road-map for a 21st century house in the 
venture capital industry taking into account the Chinese peculiarities and business 
practices: 
151 
China Market Problematic Peculiarities Mitigating Approach 
1. 0 Difficult to attain country-wide reach o Focused investment 
0 Diverse market segmentation and customer strategy 
preference within the vast market 
2. 0 Require versatile technique for emerging o Global direct investment 
market risk management presence and team-up 
0 Requires specialist advice in dealing with with well-established 
different industrial structure at different industrial operators 
economic development stages 
3. 0 Difficult to secure traditional financing o Support market leaders 
domestically and domestic rising star 
4. 0 Premature securities market potentially chokes o Multi-facet exit 
venture capital investors mechanism 
5. 0 Dynamic and volatile business environment o Responsive and prompt 
0 Need for responsive and proactive management decision making process 
6. 0 Hard to identify investment opportunities in a o Building deal flow and 
imperfect market in the absence of well- entrepreneurs networks 
established market deal flow 
7. 0 Time-consuming problem associated with o Brand recognition 
tackling regulatory constraint 
1. Focused investment strategy 
The "universal and all-rounder expert" approach in managing venture capital 
funds is no longer a panacea for successful investment houses in light of the 
increasing complex business environments. In most cases, over-aggressiveness in an 
emerging market could only lead to an undesirable dead-end "Jack-of-all-trade" 
outcome. 
This is of particular importance in penetrating a semi-open market with a vast 
diversity of geographic coverage, 
152 
2. Global direct investment presence and team-up with industrial operators 
This could lead to pooling of the necessary industrial specialist advice from 
the industrial operator as well as its pool ofbusiness talents and financial planning 
gurus' skills from the industrial operators' global direct investment experience. 
The learning curve for the new business venture could be significantly 
shortened and give a higher chance for the venture to attain commercial viability. 
3. Support market leaders and domestic rising star 
In light of the post-Crisis liquidity squeeze, venture capital houses have a 
better chance to team up with market leaders and SMEs who are fundamentally 
healthy but suffering from unhealthy across-the-board liquidity squeeze. By 
providing expansion capital to these enterprise, venture capitalists houses could speed 
up their investment cycle and getting the desirable results faster. 
The problem associated with this is increased exposure to RMB currency risk. 
As highlighted previously, the risk could be diversified by carefully planning the 
investment house's global investment portfolio. 
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4. Multi-facet exit mechanism 
Initial public offering has becoming an increasing important exit route for 
venture capitalists^^. However, within the under-developed Chinese domestic 
securities market and absence of second board^^. The venture capitalist houses, should 
thus be more flexible in formulating exit mechanisms to avoid over-reliance on IPOs. 
Alternative exit mechanism conmionly adopted by pioneering venture capital 
houses is selling matured investee companies to new market entrants through "trade 
sale" arrangements. This could be a Win-Win situation as the earnest market new-
entrants are more willing to paid a higher price to expedite their market entry plan, 
shorten the market-entry learning curves and acquire existing market share. 
5. Responsive and prompt decision making process 
Seasoned venture capitalists may recognise that enterprise operating in 
emerging market may face a broad range ofbusiness and strategic dilemmas. All 
these call for timely response and immediate attention. They will ensure all such 
business issues are identified in the early stage and properly handled. 
23 Please see illustration at the end of Chapter 4 which exemplified how IPO 
can bring the necessary capital appreciation and give an above-20% p.a. IRR return to 
venture capitalists. 
24 "Second Board" are currently under development in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. However, the market depth has yet to be proven. 
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This will require building a strong corporate infrastructure which could 
support responsive decision marking process in a dynamic environment. This 
infrastructure is essential to tackle these emerging unstructured and unprecedented 
problems. 
More importantly, the venture capitalists should be prepared to be a value-
adding partner to spearhead management attention and focus of investee companies. 
To expedite the decision making process and create agility and responsiveness in the 
investee company level, venture capital houses (as well as management team of the 
investee company) should devise a prompt decision marking process. 
6. Building deal flow and entrepreneurs networks 
Unlike in matured markets, there is no established public information channel 
for potential investment deals or forum of any form that lines-up potential investors 
with potential investees. Venture capital houses associated with banks or other 
financial institutions could attain a superior market position by tapping into their 
banking affiliate's strong local corporate banking network to identify investment 
opportunities. 
In a semi-open market, the ability to source and identify investment 
opportunities could be the single most efficient weapon to beat the other competitors. 
It has been well-recognised in the venture capital profession, "Just concentrate in 
sourcing and picking a good deal, investment realisation and project divestment will 
take good care if themselves!" 
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7. Brand recognition 
Despite investees shall be indifferent to the provider of their expansion capital, 
venture capital houses with strong brand-name always outperform their other less-
prominent counterparts in tapping potential investment opportunities. The reasons for 
their superior bargaining power include 
a. investment houses' perceived premium ability in delivering value-added advice 
and assistance to investees, 
b. investment houses' more-diversified and well-established portfolio of investees 
offers additional benefit for portfolios investees to create synergy or strategic 
alliances, and 
c. upon teaming-up with a leading investment house, investee perceives a higher 
chance to arouse investor awareness in the local business community. 
On top of this, having a large portfolio in local business community，the 
venture capital houses should have a better change to entangle legal and regulatory 
constraints and dead-locks by leveraging on their investment track records and market 
profile. This track record cold be of paramount importance (and be the most powerful 
weapon) in negotiating with PRC local (and even central) government ministries. 
Final Words 
In conclusion, for a venture capital house to excel in the 21st century 
marketplace, it should take a pro-active approach instead of an opportunistic approach 
in formulating its investment strategy and implementing its business plans. 
Venture capital industry is a human and relationship-based industry, to ensure 
a proper execution of their business plan, the venture capital houses should also build 
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up a strong and supportive in-house corporate structure to serve as their platform of 
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Epilogue 
The Chinese GDP Growth Inhibitants 
Despite the encouraging 1998 GDP growth of 7.6%, it is clear that most of last year's growth 
was fueled by massive infrastructure spending. Undeniably, these aggressive infrastructure 
project spending has been notoriously known for it inefficiency and unproductiveness. The 
author sees no reason how this infrastructure could lead to sustainable 1999 GDP growth. I 
have to admit that the heartening 1998 GDP growth failed to mask a serious structural 
problem for the Chinese economy 一- in almost each and every industry and trade sectors, the 
Chinese economy is experiencing a recession. 
We believe, in the absence of proactive counter-measures, the Chinese economic growth 
could be retarded by gross over-supply, deflation and unemployment (or the fear ofbecoming 
unemployed) 
Gross Over-Supply 
After more than one decades' exponential growth in output capacity, the Chinese economy is 
now tasting its own spoon of medicine from its over-expansions in the prior decade. 
On one hand, we see the Chinese government making aggressive investment into 
infrastructure projects, the private sector investments are, indeed, contracting. They are too 
busy to engage in new investments as they have to handle a more immediate problem - the 
problem of excess production capacity. This over-supply issue, coupled with the general 
economic difficulties, are eating into the bottom-line ofbusinesses. With this wounded 
business profitability, the financial institution is casting significant doubts on the economy 
and is reluctant to extend credit which further strains the vulnerable domestic economy. 
Deflation 
This is the undesirable effect brought about by weak consumption and high savings (with 
1997 gross national saving amounting to 38.6% of GNP versus a 1997 average of26.7% for 
the 16 Asian countries as reported by the Asian Development Bank). This is exemplified by 
the 2.6% drop in domestic retail price in 1998. To be frank, in light of the economic 
uncertainty and perceived growth in unemployment, consumers' penchant for saving is no 
surprise. Without a prosperous consumer and retail market, it will take much longer for the 
Chinese economy to recoil. 
Unemployment 
This is a terrible "afterglow" of the current SOE reform and other successful preceding 
economic reforms. On one hand, these reforms enhanced the economy's productivity, yet 
caused excess capacity in many economic sectors. Without a high-growth economy, the 
excessive workforce could not be absorbed and integrated into the economic growth engines. 
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Government's Hands are Tied 
The worst part of this story is the lack of effective government policy tools to deal with this 
problem. The 1999 budget deficit is already projected to rise by 10% and effectively blocked 
fiscal expansion. Government-backed bond issue to finance infrastructure expenditure 
appears to be the last card on table. 
However, taking into account the notoriously low efficiency of the Chinese infrastructure 
projects (literally known in Chinese to be the "tofu leftover projects") and the low multiplier 
effect that rooted from low domestic propensity to consume, chances for these infrastructure 
projects to attain sustainable GDP and economic growth are slim. 
Taking into account the extend ofPeople's Bank of China's cut in interest rate (6 times within 
the last 24 months) and the yet-to-materialize impact on investor appetite, much doubt is cast 
on the effectiveness of this traditional policy tool. The same goes for increasing money 
supply. Westem traditional monetary tools for igniting economic growth engine may not 
work well in China. We have to figure out alternative growth propellant in a semi-closed and 
self-contained economy where consumer credit and bank financing (to private-sector) have 
never been important economic element. 
The Panacea for Chinese Economy 
At this point of time, the author is still positive towards the future of China. The only 
question is could China survive the short-term pain and commit itself to far-reaching 
structural reform? 
China now faces an economic structural problem and the right (and only) medication is 
"Perseverance" 
the Perseverance to implement short-term painful reform policies, the 
Perseverance to create a more level playing field for both local and foreign 
entrepreneurs, and the Perseverance to foster a better economic platform to 
attract foreign direct investments. 
The Global Investors Concern for China 
The global investment community have become increasingly concerned about China's 
economic, financial and, ultimately, political prospects. It has become evident that more and 
more international investors are looking for alternative locations and future heats for making 
foreign direct investments. India, Brazil and Russia (despite much currency and political 
problems) are on the short-list. As economic growth in China slows down and (foreign) 
capital inflows diminish, more and more disorder is teething in the structure and functioning 
of the Chinese economy. 
At least for the moment, China does not appear to have the "typical" external liquidity 
problem that has plagued many countries in Asia, Russia and currently Brazil. Rather, at this 
stage, the Chinese problems are more microeconomic in nature. However, ifthere is further 
deterioration and as the delicate economic equilibrium dismantles, macroeconomic problems 
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could eventuate! 
It should not be surprising to find economic and financial problems appearing in an economy 
after such a lengthy period of unprecedented tremendous growth and abundant supply of 
foreign investment capital. That is particularly so for an emerging market economy like 
China. But, what really worries the international investors are the other rising problems in 
China which signal deeper issues such as a general lack of governance, management and 
control ofthe economy by the different levels of government and between different levels of 
government coupled with a lack of transparency inside the working of the economy that 
nurtures bribery and corruption. 
The Foreign Investors are Re-thinking their China Investment Strategies 
This has already led to some hesitation for foreign investors and a slower growth ofcapital 
influx. The resultant lack of political desire to forcefully proceed with much-needed 
structural reform of state-owned enterprises and the financial sector could be disastrous. 
Such political desire may spark another new wave of investor concerns. Undeniably, much 
improvement has already been shown but foreign investors are, indeed, expecting more 
profound initiatives by the Chinese government. 
The positive economic benefits from earlier structural reforms (such as agricultural sector 
reform and the introduction of special economic zones) have largely run their course in their 
positive effects on economic growth. To maintain growth that is adequate from both 
economic and political imperatives requires significant industrial reform. Such structural 
industrial reform should be escorted by related modifications in complimentary areas such as 
regulatory framework predictability and banking reform. 
While much is being said about reforms, such as SOE and banking reforms, not much appears 
to have been done to satisfy the foreign investors whose patience and perseverance is 
gradually declining. Of course, most investors still remain positive towards the structural 
reforms in China, but some of them already lost their forbearance and immediate action is 
required to resuscitate their confidence in China. 
Is the Chinese Government Taking the Right Medicine to revive the Economy ？ 
To counteract the lack of growth momentum, government infrastructure spending has 
increased enormously and largely financed by new issues of government debt paper. This 
spending cannot continue very long under the existing set offlscal concerns. That gives rise 
to higher possibility ofRenminbi devaluation aim at spurring the foreign trade sector as an 
engine of growth. This aggressive spending may not produce the desired growth impetus! 
OJnfortunately, our HK SAR government is applying similar tactics to revive our economy.) 
What really counts for the Chinese government's penchant to aggressive fiscal spending is its 
undesirable consequence. Failure to boost domestic GDP growth by this aggressive fiscal 
spending may result in sweeping hazard not only causing problems to other Asian countries 
but also to foreign currency debtors and investors in China. 
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Heart of the Question 
As mentioned repeatedly in this report, China (and emerging market) investing is, basically, 
an issue ofglobal risk management for intemational investors. The choice ofinvest (or not) 
in China is, in fact, 
a Delicate Balance . •. a Dynamic One as well ！ 斷 
"5trategic cost ofM)rinvesting" 
against 
"i^inancial cost ofInvesting"! 
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